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Abstract
We study the classic sequential screening problem in the presence of ex post participation con-
straints. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions that determine when the optimal selling
mechanism is either static or sequential. In the static contract, the buyers are not screened with
respect to their interim type and the object is sold at a posted price. In the sequential contract, the
buyers are screened with respect to their interim type and a menu of quantities is offered.
We completely characterize the optimal sequential contract with binary interim types and a
continuum of ex post values. Importantly, the optimal sequential contract randomizes the allocation
of the low-type buyer and awards a deterministic allocation to the high type buyer. Finally, we
provide additional results for the case of multiple interim types.
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Sequential screening models have been used extensively in economics and revenue management to study
optimal contract design when buyers learn their values over time. In the classic formulation of sequential
screening pioneered by Courty and Li (2000), a profit-maximizing seller (he) faces a single buyer (she)
or, alternatively, a continuum of buyers. The buyer initially has partial and private information about
her value, for example the mean, and privately learns her true value at some later time. In the classic
setting, each buyer is required to participate ex interim: her expected gains at the time of contracting
have to exceed their outside option. A salient example discussed by Courty and Li (2000) is the airline
industry, in which travelers purchase tickets in advance but may only realize their true value as the date
of the trip approaches.
Although the optimal contracts that arise may offer partial refunds, the initial advanced price is
high enough such that some travelers experience negative ex post utility while still being willing to
participate ex interim. This situation also arises in other industries, such as hotels, theaters or even
railroads where advanced pricing and partial refunds contracts are also offered.
In many online markets, however, the seller is constrained to sell products such that the buyer
obtains a nonnegative net utility once she has realized her value, thus ex post. For example, in online
shopping, buyers may have the option to return a purchased item after delivery, usually at zero or low
cost (Krähmer and Strausz (2015)). In the online display advertising market, typical business constraints
prohibit publishers from using upfront fees (Balseiro, Mirrokni, and Paes Leme (2018)). Instead, the
publishers run auctions, typically some version of first- or second-price auctions that satisfy the ex post
participation constraints. Thus, the seller needs to guarantee participation not only initially – at the
interim level – but also after the buyers have completely learned their value – at the ex post level.
Motivated by these new markets, we study the sequential screening problem as described by Courty
and Li (2000) and incorporate ex post participation constraints. Ex post participation constraints rule
out the optimal contracts derived by Courty and Li (2000) with upfront fees. As pointed out by
Krähmer and Strausz (2015), because different upfront fees cannot be used to price discriminate the
different buyers, it may be that a static contract, one that does not screen the buyers ex interim, becomes
optimal under ex post participation constraints. Building on the work by Krähmer and Strausz (2015),
our objective is to understand when the optimal selling mechanism is static (buyers are not screened
ex interim) or sequential (buyers are screened interim), and to obtain a full characterization of such
contracts. Our work highlights the significant revenue improvements that can be attained by using a
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sequential relative to a static contract, even in the presence of ex post participation constraints.
Our model considers a seller who is selling at most one unit of an object to a buyer. The sequence
of events unfolds in two periods. In the first period, the buyer privately learns her interim type, for
example the mean of her value distribution, and the parties contract. We begin the analysis assuming
binary interim types of the buyer, thus high and low. The high type has a distribution of ex post
values that dominates the distribution of the low-type in some stochastic order. The contract specifies
allocation and payments as a function of reported interim type and ex post value. In the second period,
the buyer privately learns her value, and allocations and transfers are realized. At this point, the buyer
accepts the contracting terms only if her realized net utility is weakly larger than her outside option.
This model aligns with our aforementioned examples. In online shopping, the first period corresponds
to the purchasing time. At this time the buyer possesses private information about her expected value
but she only learns her true realized value in the subsequent period. In the second period, the buyer is
delivered the item and has the option to return it, at low or no cost. In the case of display advertising,
some publishers use a sequence of auctions known as “waterfall auctions” that implicitly impose different
priorities over participants.1 Commonly, higher-priority auctions have higher reserve prices. The first
period can be regarded as the time at which the buyer decides in which auction (priority/reserve) to
participate. The second period is when the auctions are actually run.
1.2 Results
The first main result characterizes when a static contract—that is, a contract that does not sequentially
screen buyers—is optimal. In Theorem 1, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the
optimality of the static contract, termed the profit-to-rent condition. In the optimal static contract the
seller offers a single and uniform price to all types.
In Theorem 2, we characterize the optimal mechanism when this profit-to-rent condition fails and a
static contract is no longer optimal. The scope for revenue improvement through a sequential contract
is perhaps easiest to grasp by assuming for a moment that the seller were to know the interim type.
From this, admittedly hypothetical, perspective, the uniform static price is too high for the low-type
and too low for the high type. As each type has a different ex post distribution of values, the seller
would ideally prefer to better tailor the price to the distribution of ex post values. To increase his
revenue relative to the static contract, the seller could try to increase the price for the high-type buyer
or decrease the price for the low-type buyer. However, either change would lead the high type to
1See, for example, https://adexchanger.com/the-sell-sider/the-programmatic-waterfall-mystery. A similar dynamic oc-
curs when sellers offer “preferred deals” to advertisers (see, for example, Mirrokni and Nazerzadeh (2017)).
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mimic the low type. A more promising option is to lower the allocation for (some) low-type buyers
while simultaneously reducing the price charged to them. This allows the seller to serve more ex post
values of the low type while deterring the high types from taking the low types’ contract. Now, the
profit-to-rent condition establishes exactly when this pricing deviation is not profitable for the seller.
The profit-to-rent condition is hence necessary for the optimality of the static contract. Notably, we
also show that it is sufficient. The profit-to-rent condition is a weighted monotonicity condition for the
virtual value around the optimal static threshold. In the case of exponentially distributed values, we
can show that the static contract is optimal if and only if the means of the distributions of the low and
high types are sufficiently close.
In line with the above intuition, we find in Theorem 2 that the optimal sequential contract provides
a lower quantity to the low type, or equivalently randomizes the allocation of the object between 0 and
1, and assigns a deterministic allocation of 1 to the high type. Randomization is needed to deter the
high-type buyer from taking the low type’s contract. Specifically, the optimal contract is characterized
by an allocation probability x ∈ (0, 1), and three thresholds θ1, θ2, and θH with θ1 ≤ θH ≤ θ2. In
this contract, the seller allocates the object to a low-type buyer with probability x whenever her value
is between θ1 and θ2 and asks for a payment of θ1 · x. When the true value of the low type is above
θ2, then the object is always allocated to her, and the seller demands a payment of θ2 − (θ2 − θ1) · x.
The high-type buyer obtains the object with certainty and only when her value is above θH , at which
point the payment she has to make to the seller is θH . These parameters are set such that the interim
incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied.
A salient feature of this type of contract is that it discriminates the low type in two dimensions.
First, we establish that θ1 is above the threshold a seller would set if she were selling exclusively to low-
type buyers. That is, the low-type buyer is allocated the object less often in the presence of high-type
buyers. The opposite holds for high-type buyers: they are allocated the object more often than if they
were alone. Second, there is a range of values for which the object is sold to the low type with some
probability strictly below one, which further reduces the likelihood that a low type will receive the
object compared to a case in which there are no high-type buyers. We illustrate these results with
the example of the exponential distribution, for which we have explicit solutions. We find that for
exponential values, the sequential contract can exhibit revenue improvements exceeding 40% over the
static contract.
Towards the end of the paper, we consider several extensions of our base model. Notably, we study
the case of many interim types. Theorem 3 generalizes the profit-to-rent condition to a setting with an
arbitrary number of interim types. We also explore the structure of the optimal sequential contract and
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the challenges that arise in this setting.
1.3 Related Work
Our model builds on the sequential screening literature, as pioneered by Courty and Li (2000), with
an interim participation constraint.2 In contrast, in this paper, we impose an ex post participation
constraint. The most closely related paper to ours that studies sequential screening with ex post
participation constraints is Krähmer and Strausz (2015). They establish that the static contract is
optimal under a monotonicity condition regarding the cross-hazard rate functions. This condition
rules out some common distributions for values such as the exponential distribution. Furthermore, the
condition is only sufficient and, therefore, does not provide a complete characterization of when the
static contract is optimal. We close this gap by providing a necessary and sufficient condition under
which the static contract is optimal. Our condition leverages the economic intuition that lies behind
a potential profitable deviation from the optimal static contract. Furthermore and importantly, when
the condition fails, we characterize the optimal sequential mechanism and show that randomization of
one of the interim types is required for optimality.3
In terms of approaches, Krähmer and Strausz (2015) relax both the local incentive constraint of the
low-type and the monotonicity constraint. Then, they show that under these conditions, the contract
that maximizes the Lagrangian is deterministic and that, as a result, the static contract is optimal.
In contrast, we also relax the local incentive constraint but maintain the monotonicity constraint. For
the relaxed problem, we perform a first-principle analysis, in the style of Samuelson (1984) and Fuchs
and Skrzypacz (2015), that leads us to identify the structure of the optimal contract. In turn, this
permits us to characterize the optimal sequential contract when the static condition fails. In a recent
work, Heumann (2019) considers a setting in which a seller can design the screening mechanism and
the information disclosure mechanism with ex post participation constraints.
The sequential nature of our model and the presence of ex post participation constraints is related to
the work of Ashlagi, Daskalakis, and Haghpanah (2016) and Balseiro, Mirrokni, and Paes Leme (2018).
These authors consider a model (also motivated by the display advertising market) in which a seller,
2See Akan, Ata, and Dana (2015) for a recent adaptation of the Courty and Li (2000) formulation to study advanced
purchase contracts in revenue management settings.
3See also Manelli and Vincent (2007) and Daskalakis, Deckelbaum, and Tzamos (2015) for examples of multi-good envi-
ronments in which stochastic allocations can improve over deterministic allocations. In a separate contribution, Krähmer
and Strausz (2016) establish that with multiple units, as opposed to a single unit, generically, the static contract is not
optimal for the sequential screening problem with ex post participation constraints.
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constrained by ex post participation , repeatedly sells objects to a buyer whose values are independent
across periods. Both papers provide characterizations for a nearly optimal mechanism. They are
different from ours because we consider a single sale and construct the exact optimal mechanism in a
sequential screening model. Krähmer and Kovac (2016) share our concern with static vs. sequential
mechanisms in a delegation environment. While the delegation environment in Krähmer and Kovac
(2016) is substantially different from the quasi-linear environment that we investigate here, some of
our arguments are similar to theirs. In particular, in Theorem 1, we establish that a simple necessary
condition for optimality can be extended to a necessary and sufficient condition. The necessary condition
involves a comparison of cost and benefits in terms of virtual values, in a manner similar to Proposition
3 in Krähmer and Kovac (2016).4
Our optimal mechanism is related to the BIN-TAC auction derived in the context of online display
advertising by Celis, Lewis, Mobius, and Nazerzadeh (2014). This is a static auction that offers two
options to advertisers: a buy-it-now (BIN) option in which buyers can purchase the impression at a
posted high price, and a take-a-chance (TAC) option in which the highest bidders are randomly allocated
the impression (if no bidder went for the BIN). This auction is tailored to approximate ironing in the
classic static Myerson setting for nonregular distributions that commonly arise in display advertising
settings. This mechanism is similar in spirit to ours because it randomizes low-value buyers to separate
them from high-values buyers. However, with one bidder, the BIN-TAC auction reduces to a posted
price which corresponds to the static contract in our setting. In contrast to their static setting, we
study a two-period model in which the buyer is sequentially screened, and randomization occurs even
with a single bidder.
2 Model
2.1 Payoffs
We consider a seller (he) who is selling one unit of an object at zero cost to a buyer (she) with an
outside option of zero value. Both parties are risk-neutral and have quasilinear utility functions. The
sequence of events unfolds in two periods.
In the first period, the buyer privately learns her interim type (or simply type) and then the parties
contract. The type provides information about the distribution of the ex post values (or simply value)
of the buyer— her true willingness-to-pay for the object. The contract specifies allocation and payment
4We thank the editor and an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to the result in Krähmer and Kovac (2016).
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as a function of reported interim type and ex post value. In the second period, the buyer privately
learns her value, and allocations and transfers are realized.
There are finitely many types, denoted k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, and the prior probability of type k is given
by αk with αk > 0 and
∑K
k=1 αk = 1. In the second period, a buyer of type k privately learns her value θ
which we assume to have a continuously differentiable distribution function Fk(θ) and associated density
function fk(θ), with full support in Θ ⊆ [0,∞]. We assume that Θ is a connected interval of the form
[0, θ]. It will be convenient to denote the upper cumulative distribution function by:
F k(θ) , 1− Fk(θ).
All the distributions are common knowledge. The virtual value of interim type k is given by:
µk(θ) , θ −
1− Fk(θ)
fk(θ)
, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, ∀θ ∈ Θ.
For the remainder of the paper, we make the standard assumption that the hazard rate
fk(θ)
1− Fk(θ)
, is increasing in θ,∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. (IHR)
This assumption facilitates our discussion. However, our formal results will require a weaker assumption
that we introduce later.
The terms of trade are specified by the seller in the first period. For a payment t ∈ R and a
probability of receiving the object x ∈ [0, 1], a buyer with value θ receives a utility of θ ·x− t, while the
seller is paid t.
We assume that the buyer agrees to purchase the object only if she is guaranteed a nonnegative net
utility for any possible value of the object she might have. That is, we require θ ·x− t to be nonnegative
for all θ. The seller’s problem is to design a contract that maximizes his expected payment, satisfying
the ex post participation and incentive compatibility constraints.
2.2 Direct Mechanism
By means of the revelation principle (see, e.g., Myerson (1979)) we can focus on incentive compatible
direct revelation mechanisms, with allocations xk : Θ→ [0, 1] and transfers tk : Θ→ R that depend on
reported interim type k′ and ex post value θ′. Then, for a buyer reporting an interim type k′ and an ex
post type θ′, the mechanism allocates the object with probability xk′(θ
′) and charges the buyer tk′(θ
′).
We define the ex post utility of a buyer who truthfully reported k in the first period and θ′ in the
second period while her true value is θ as
uk(θ; θ
′) , θ · xk(θ′)− tk(θ′),
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with the understanding that uk(θ) , uk(θ; θ) . Similarly, we define the interim expected utility of a






We note that with distributions with common support Θ, we can restrict attention to single deviations.
There are two kinds of incentive compatibility constraints that must be satisfied by our mechanism.
The first is the ex post incentive compatibility constraint (ICxp), which requires that for any report in
the first period, truth-telling is optimal in the second period:
uk(θ) ≥ uk(θ; θ′) ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, ∀θ ∈ Θ. (ICxp)
The second is the interim incentive compatibility constraint (ICi) which requires that truth-telling is
optimal in the first period:
Ukk ≥ Ukk′ ∀k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. (ICi)
Finally, we require the mechanism to satisfy the ex post individual rationality constraint (IRxp):
uk(θ) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, ∀θ ∈ Θ. (IRxp)







tk(z) · fk(z)dz (P)
s.t (ICi), (ICxp), (IRxp)
0 ≤ x ≤ 1 ,
where we use boldfaces to denote the vector x = (x1, ..., xK). Observe that (IR
xp) implies interim
individual rationality (IR). In fact, if we were to relax (P) by considering only interim IR we would be
in the setting of Courty and Li (2000) for discrete interim types.
In general, one of two types of contracts can arise as an optimal solution to the seller’s problem (P):
static or sequential. A static solution to problem (P) corresponds to the case in which the allocations
and transfers (xk, tk) do not depend on the interim type k. In this case, we have a single menu (x, t)
that is offered to the buyer, and the contract does not screen among interim types. We use (Ps) to
denote the version of (P) constrained to static contracts, which we refer to as the static program. In
contrast, a sequential solution allows for different menus that depend on the interim type k, and each
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type of buyer self-selects into one of the menus. The problem (P), referred to as the sequential program,
allows for such solutions.
The main focus of this paper is twofold. The first is to study when the optimal solutions to the
static and sequential programs, (Ps) and (P), coincide. Second, when they do not coincide, we aim to
characterize the optimal solution to (P).
3 A Classic Example of Sequential Screening
We use the opening example of Courty and Li (2000) to illustrate the power of sequential screening in
the presence of an ex post participation constraint. We show that a sequential contract outperforms
the static contract.
In the opening example, there are two types of potential buyers, low-type and high type. One-third
of potential buyers are low-type with value uniformly distributed in [1, 2]; two-thirds are high-type
buyers with value uniformly distributed in [0, 1] ∪ [2, 3].5 Courty and Li (2000) regard of the low type
as a leisure traveler and the high type as a business traveler with the same mean but larger variance in
her value. The seller has a production cost equal to 1.
The optimal static contract sets the optimal monopoly price, p̂, equal to 2, which yields a profit of
1/3. The static contract only serves high types who have high realized values. Courty and Li (2000)
show that the seller can significantly increase his profits with sequential screening by offering a menu
of advanced payments/partial refund contracts subject to the weaker interim participation constraints.
The optimal contract offers an advanced payment of 1.5 and no refund to the leisure traveler and an
advanced payment of 1.75 and a partial refund of 1 to the business traveler. Note that in this contract
some buyers will experience a realized negative net utility. For example, the leisure traveler initially
pays 1.5, but her actual value can be any value within [1, 2], and therefore, half of the time, she will
obtain negative net utility after learning her value. Because of the advanced payment, the contract does
not satisfy the ex post participation constraint.
By contrast, the following version of a sequential contract does satisfy the ex post participation
constraints. The seller offers a menu of two quantities and prices, (xL, pL) and (xH , pH). The high item
is set equal to the optimal static contract, that is, (xH , pH) = (1, 2). Thus, the selling price for the high
type is 2, and high types that buy receive the full quantity. Next, we determine the optimal quantity
5We note that the opening example of Courty and Li (2000) violates the common support assumption made above in
Section 2. However, the failure of the common support does not affect our argument.
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and price for the low-type buyer. Given the contract for the high type, the seller’s profit is given by:
1
3






where xL ∈ [0, 1] and pL ∈ [1, 2]. We need to ensure that the menu is interim incentive compatible. The
incentive constraint of the low type is always satisfied (pH equals 2), and the incentive constraint of the
































/2 that, in turn, delivers a profit of
2/3 − 1/(2
√




From this basic exercise, we learn an important lesson: even in this simple setting, a sequential
contract can have substantial benefits over a static contract. In this paper, we study more generally
when a sequential contract outperforms a static contract and what drives this revenue improvement.
4 Optimality of Static Contract
In the main result of this section, Theorem 1, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for
the static contract to be optimal. We begin with a reformulation of the problem based on standard
techniques that use the envelope theorem, and enable us to solve for the allocation and utilities of the
lowest ex post types instead of both allocations and transfers. Using the reformulation we characterize
the optimal static contract. In Section 4.2, we use the optimal static contract and a simple deviation
analysis to obtain an intuitive necessary condition for its optimality. In Section 4.3, we show that this
condition is both necessary and sufficient.
4.1 Problem Reformulation and Static Solution
We obtain a more amenable characterization of the constraints by eliminating the transfers as in the
classical Myersonian analysis.
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Lemma 1 (Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Implementation)
The mechanism (x, t) satisfies (ICi),(ICxp) and (IRxp) if and only if
1. xk(·) is a nondecreasing function for all k in {1, . . . ,K} and
uk(θ) = uk(0) +
∫ θ
0
xk(z)dz, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, ∀θ ∈ Θ. (1)
2. uk(0) ≥ 0 for all k in {1, . . . ,K}.
3. uk(0) +
∫
Θ xk(z)F k(z)dz ≥ uk′(0) +
∫
Θ xk′(z)F k(z)dz for all k, k
′ in {1, . . . ,K}.
All proofs are provided in the Appendix. The first condition in the lemma is the standard envelope
condition and comes from the ex post incentive compatibility constraint. The second condition is derived
from the ex post IR constraint and the fact that uk(θ) is nondecreasing. The third condition is the
envelope formula inserted into the interim incentive compatibility constraint.
Lemma 1 enables us to obtain a more compact formulation of the seller’s problem. Specifically, we
can use equation (1) and integration by parts to write the objective of (P) in terms of the allocation
rule x and the indirect utilities {uk(0)}Kk=1 of the lowest ex post types. To this end, we denote each













s.t xk(θ) nondecreasing, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}




xk(z)F k(z)dz ≥ uk′ +
∫
Θ
xk′(z)F k(z)dz, ∀k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
Note that in (P), the variables are the allocation rule x and the vector of the indirect utilities of the
lowest ex post types u. Once we solve for these variables the transfers are determined by equation (1).
As noted above, a solution to (P) that screens the interim types is a sequential contract. In contrast,
a static solution to (P) pools the interim types. Formally, we say that a solution to (P) or contract is
static when xk(·) , x(·) and uk , u for all k in {1, . . . ,K}.
We previously defined the virtual value µk(·) of interim type k. Given (IHR), the virtual value for
each type k has exactly one zero, which we denote by θ̂k. Without loss of generality, we assume for the
remainder of the paper that we have ordered the interim types such that
θ̂1 ≤ · · · ≤ θ̂K .
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It turns out that solving (P) over the space of static contracts is a simpler problem. The (ICxi)
constraints disappear from the problem because in this case there is effectively only one interim type.
Additionally, it is clear that any optimal solution sets uk = 0 for all k in {1, . . . ,K}. Therefore, the












where a simple calculation shows that the term in parentheses is equal to the virtual value function of
the mixture distribution times the density function of the mixture. Hence, this problem corresponds to
the classic optimal monopoly price problem applied to the mixture distribution over types. The relevant









is always given by a threshold value θ̂, which can be implemented by a single posted price p̂ = θ̂.
Lemma 2 (Threshold Allocation)
A solution to (Ps) is a threshold value characterized by θ̂ ∈ [θ̂1, θ̂K ] that maximizes (2).
4.2 A Necessary Condition
In the remainder of this and the next section, we state the results for the setting with binary interim
types. We denote the low-type by L and the high type by H. In Section 6.1, we return to the general
setting with finitely many interim types.
The static optimal solution is characterized by a threshold value θ̂. In this section, we leverage
this characterization and perform an analysis in the style of Bulow and Roberts (1989), to deduce an
intuitive necessary condition for the optimality of the static contract. As we will show later in Section
4.3 this condition turns out to be not only necessary but also sufficient.














Figure 1: Weighted virtual valuations for low-type (dotted line) and high type (dashed line) buyer
around θ̂. The shaded areas correspond to the virtual revenue that the seller misses when using a static
contract with respect to the case in which the interim types are public information.
We note that we do not need this assumption for the formal arguments.
Suppose now that a static contract is optimal, that is, setting a single posted price equal to θ̂ for
both types solves (P). Consider Figure 1, where we have plotted the virtual value weighted by the
density function for each type.6 If the types were public information, the seller would optimally set
posted prices equal to θ̂L and θ̂H for types L and H, respectively. In this way, the seller would serve
buyers if and only if they have positive virtual values. In contrast, when selecting a single posted price θ̂,
there is surplus that the seller is not extracting; the shaded area shows the regions of the virtual values
for each type that the static contract is not capturing. For the high type, the static contract serves too
many buyers, some of them with negative virtual values; hence, the seller would be better off by offering
a higher price. For the low-type, the static contract serves too few buyers, leaving positive virtual value
buyers unserved; hence, the seller would prefer to choose a lower price. A challenge, however, is that
the seller faces incentive compatibility constraints that restrict such possible deviations/improvements:
1. Selling to fewer high types implies increasing the price for high types; however, the high types
then have an incentive to accept the low-type contract, and such a deviation is not feasible.
2. Selling to more low types amounts to reducing the price from θ̂ to some value θ1. However, to
prevent the high types from taking the low-type contract the seller must decrease the quantity
6 Representing the virtual value weighted by the density fk(·) allows for a convenient geometric argument in which the













Figure 2: Weighted virtual valuations for low-type (dotted line) and high-type (dashed line) buyers
around θ̂. The shaded areas correspond to the virtual revenue that the seller leaves on the table when
using a static contract with respect to the case in which the interim types are public information. We
display the deviation from the static contract for the low-type (solid line). If the solid areas A and B
are such that A−B ≥ 0, the deviation is profitable.
offered to the low types (or equivalently, randomize their allocation).
This second improvement is feasible by choosing a quantity (probability) 0 < xL < 1 for all low
types within an interval [θ1, θ2] with θ1 ≤ θ̂ ≤ θ2; see Figure 2.
Formally, these allocations correspond to the following menu:
xL(θ) ,

0 if θ < θ1,
xL if θ1 ≤ θ ≤ θ2,
1 if θ2 < θ;
xH(θ) ,
0 if θ < θ̂,1 if θ̂ ≤ θ; (4)
with uL = uH = 0. We refer to this deviation as an interior variation or improvement.
The interior improvement is feasible only if it satisfies both incentive compatibility constraints.











and for the high type:
∫ θ̄
θ̂




















which contains both incentive compatibility constraints. The monotone hazard rate condition (3) guar-
antees that xL as given by (5) always exists.
7 The interior variation is thus feasible, and we can select
xL to maximize the seller’s revenue.








and since µL(θ) ≥ 0 in [θ1, θ2] (see Figure 2) the right-hand side inequality in (5) must be tight.
With the interior variation, the seller serves more low-value buyers in [θ1, θ̂] at the level of xL. This
comes at the expense of offering a lower quantity, a loss of 1 − xL to buyers with values in [θ̂, θ2]. In
Figure 2, the area A corresponds to the additional revenue the seller can make due to the variation
because he is serving more low-type buyers, and region B is the efficiency loss due to the incentive
constraints.
If the static contract is optimal, then this variation cannot be profitable. In terms of Figure 2 this
means the areas must satisfy A ≤ B. Hence, if the static contract is optimal, then
A = xL ·
∫ θ̂
θ1




In turn, since the optimal choice of xL always equals the right-hand side of (5), we can insert xL in












To better understand this inequality, consider a seller who faces a buyer with values distributed according
to Fk(·). Observe that at any given price θb the expected profit Πk(θb) of the seller and the expected
informational rent Ik(θb) of the buyer are given by:
Πk(θb) , θb · (1− Fk(θb)) =
∫ θ̄
θb




7Indeed, condition (3) is equivalent to (1 − FL(θ))/(1 − FH(θ)) being decreasing. Then (1 − FL(θ))(1 − FH(θ′)) ≤















from which (5) follows.
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If the monopolist considers lowering the price from θb to θa then the change in profit is Πk(θa)−Πk(θb).
The lower price positively impacts the information rents which increase by Ik(θa)− Ik(θb). The ratio
Πk(θa)−Πk(θb)
Ik(θa)− Ik(θb)
is then a measure of the average impact on profits per unit of consumer rents that seller experiences
due to the price variation.
Now, condition (6) can be rewritten to obtain a version of this ratio across different interim types.
To this end, we set k = L in the numerator and k = H in the denominator. This suggests the following:
Definition 1 (Average Profit-to-Rent Ratio)










, ∀j, k ∈ {L,H}, 0 ≤ θa ≤ θb ≤ θ̄.
The average profit-to-rent ratio measures the changes in the seller’s profit in terms of the information
rents he gives away to the consumer due to a change in price. The ratio Rjk compares the impact on
profit from type j with the increase in the information rent to type k. This cross ratio arises because the
incentive compatibility constraint for type k implies that a modification in the contract for type j also
affects type k. This was clear from our discussion regarding the interior variation above. There, a price
θ1 (smaller than θ̂) for type L creates a profit improvement for the seller measured by the numerator of
R. Since the seller has to ensure that type H does not take the type-L contract (by reducing quantity),
this price decrease generates a loss for the seller quantified by the denominator of R.
Returning to (6), we note that the numerator in either ratio refers to the revenue that the seller
makes from the low type over some interval, and the denominator refers to the information rent of the
high type over the same interval. Now, since the choice of θ1, θ2 was arbitrary, we obtain the following
necessary condition by taking the minimum and maximum on both sides of the inequality in (6). If the
static contract is optimal, then
max
θ1≤θ̂
RLH(θ1, θ̂) ≤ min
θ̂≤θ2
RLH(θ̂, θ2), (7)
The above condition establishes that if the static contract is optimal, then any extra revenue the
seller can garner from low-type buyers is offset by the efficiency loss due to the incentive compatibility
constraints: A−B ≤ 0 for any possible choice of θ1 and θ2.
To prove sufficiency in Theorem 1, we rely on a dualization-type of argument. For the necessity,
we assume that condition (7) is not satisfied and then show that there is a profitable deviation as
established by the following proposition.
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Proposition 1 (Revenue Improvement)
Suppose that µL(θ)fL(θ)/(1−FL(θ)) is nondecreasing. Assume that condition (7) does not hold. Then,
there exists θ1, θ2 such that θ1 < θ̂ < θ2 and R
LH(θ1, θ̂) > R









yields a strict improvement in (P) over the static contract.
In the proof of Proposition 1, we see that once condition (7) fails, two things happen. First, a
non-static contract becomes feasible, which does not violate the incentive constraints. The mere fact
that (7) fails implies the feasibility of the new allocation. Second, the sequential contract guarantees
an expected revenue greater than the static revenue.
4.3 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition
We now establish that condition (7) is in fact a sufficient condition for the optimal static solution
to coincide with the optimal solution to (P). Before we provide the main theorem, we introduce some
notation for the quantities of interest that will help us to further refine our intuition. While we maintain
the binary type framework here, we note that all definitions naturally extend to finitely many types as
we will see in Section 6.1.
The local version of the average profit-to-rent ratio, when θa < θ̂ < θb are close to θ̂, gives rise to
the profit-to-rent ratio.
Definition 2 (Profit-to-Rent Ratio)




, ∀j, k ∈ {L,H},∀θ ∈ Θ.
The ratio rjk(θb) is obtained as limθa↑θb R
jk(θa, θb). Observe that condition (IHR) implies that
rkk(θ) is nondecreasing for each k ∈ {L,H}. The latter is the condition we use for our formal results.
Now, we are ready to state and discuss the main result of this section.
Theorem 1 (Optimality of Static Contract)
Suppose that rkk(θ) is nondecreasing for each k ∈ {L,H}. The static contract is optimal if and only if
max
θ≤θ̂




This result complements the necessary condition given in Section 4.2 by showing that it is also
sufficient. We showed in Section 4.2 that condition (APR) established that the specific deviation that
increases the sales to the lower type with a lower quantity is not profitable relative to the static contract.
Theorem 1 now establishes that this in fact is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition. The
sufficient condition is noteworthy because it arises from “simple” deviations, namely, those that assign
the low-type an interior allocation in a small interval around the static optimal price. In particular,
we do not need to be concerned with either more elaborate deviations that offer the low type several
options in her menu, nor do we need to trace simultaneous changes to the offers to the high type. The
core of the sufficiency argument is that the nonprofitability of simple deviations from the static optimal
contract is enough to establish optimality of the static contract. The present theorem confirms that this
type of interior improvement for the low-type is sufficient to study changes in the seller’s revenue. In
Section 5, we establish that the family of allocations suggested by the interior variation also completely
describes the optimal sequential mechanism.
In the Introduction, we noted that Krähmer and Kovac (2016) provided necessary and sufficient
conditions for the optimality of a static contract (versus a sequential contract) in a delegation environ-
ment similar to Amador and Bagwell (2013). Their Proposition 3 established necessary and (almost)
sufficient conditions by considering a ratio of virtual utilities similar to the ratio given by (6). While the
exact shape of the virtual utility differs in the quasi-linear and the delegation environment, the logic of
the argument is related.
4.4 The Exponential Example
Before we establish the optimal sequential contract, it might be helpful to build some intuition for the
above results. We will consider the case of exponentially distributed values. The main result of this
section establishes that the static contract is optimal if and only if the means of the interim types are
sufficiently close.
We consider the exponential density functions
fk(θ) = λke
−λkθ, k = {L,H} θ ≥ 0.
We assume that λL > λH , where L and H stand for the low and high type, respectively. Note that
H has a higher mean (1/λH) than L (1/λL) and that H dominates L in the sense of the hazard rate
stochastic order and in first-order stochastic dominance. In addition, for the interim probabilities, we
have αL + αH = 1 with αL, αH > 0.
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We begin by studying the optimal solution to the static formulation. The optimal static contract
is given by a threshold allocation. Thus, in the exponential case, the seller’s expected revenue for any




(αLµL(z)fL(z) + αHµH(z)fH(z))dz = αLθe
−λLθ + αHθe
−λHθ.










−λHθ = 0. (8)
That is, the optimal threshold is a zero of the mixture virtual value. Note that equation (8) cannot be
explicitly solved; however, we can (as we do in the forthcoming results) provide comparative statics.
Interestingly, in Proposition 4 below, we show that we can obtain explicit expressions for the thresholds
characterizing the optimal sequential contract. The following lemma provides some initial properties of
the optimal static contract.
Lemma 3
The optimal solution to (Ps) is a threshold allocation characterized by θ̂ in [ 1λL ,
1
λH
], solving (8). More-
over, θ̂ is a nonincreasing function of αL with θ̂(0) =
1
λH
and θ̂(1) = 1λL .
Next, we state a necessary and sufficient condition for the static contract to be optimal.
Proposition 2 (Necessity and Sufficiency for the Exponential Model)
The static contract is optimal if and only if




The result follows from Theorem 1. We note that the threshold value θ̂ in the inequality is a solution
to equation (8) and, therefore, depends on the parameters λL and λH . Subsequent corollaries provide
sharper characterizations that depend solely on the model primitives. We highlight that (9) corresponds
to a particular case of condition (APR).
Proposition 2 provides an intuitive characterization for when the seller is better off screening the
interim types than not. In terms of equation (9), when λL and λH are sufficiently close, equation (9)
should hold, in which case the static contract is optimal. Conversely, when λL and λH are sufficiently
distant, the static contract will not be optimal.
Intuitively, when the interim types are similar, any contract that screens the types would be close
in terms of expected revenue to the static contract because for each type it could obtain at most what
19
it would obtain by setting thresholds 1/λL and 1/λH , respectively, but θ̂ belongs to [
1
λL
, 1λH ]. However,
when screening, the seller has to pay an extra cost to prevent the types from mimicking each other, and
since the contracts’ revenues will be similar, it is likely that this cost offsets the earnings from screening.
On the other hand, when interim types are sufficiently distant in their mean value, the seller can tailor
the contract to each type and in this way extract more from them than in the static contract.
Corollary 1 (Optimality of Static Contract)
If λL ∈ (λH , 2λH ], then for any αL ∈ [0, 1], the static contract is optimal.
This result establishes that when the distributions of the low- and high-type buyers are sufficiently
close to each other, the static contract is always optimal, regardless of the proportion between types.
Corollary 2 (Comparative Statics in αL)
If λL > 2λH , then there exists ᾱ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all αL ∈ (0, ᾱ) the sequential contract is strictly
optimal, and for all αL ∈ [ᾱ, 1] the static contract is optimal.
Corollary 2 asserts that when the means of low and high types are sufficiently distinct, the optimality
of the static vs. the sequential contract is determined by the frequency of each type. If the proportion
of low types is sufficiently low (but not zero), then the seller is better off screening the types. On the
other hand, if there is a large proportion of low types, then the static contract is optimal. This follows
because the threshold value θ̂ decreases as αL increases.
Corollary 3 (Comparative Statics in λL)
For fixed λH and αH , there exists λ̄L such that for all λL ∈ (λ̄L,∞), the sequential contract is strictly
optimal.
4.5 Discussion





Krähmer and Strausz (2015) introduced an expanded monotonicity condition that relates any pair of




are increasing in θ, ∀j, k ∈ {L,H}. (R)
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Outside this set the static contract
Figure 3: Optimality of the static contract for (IHR) distributions, with K = 2 and a single buyer.
They show that under condition (R), the optimal solutions to (P) and (Ps) coincide; thus, the static
contract is optimal. In fact, they show this result for multiple interim types. We discuss our generaliza-
tion of condition (APR) to multiple types in Section 6.1. However, condition (R) is rather restrictive
and not satisfied by some common distributions. For example, the condition is not satisfied by any pair
of exponential distributions, because in this case, the cross-hazard rate is given by:
hjk(θ) = λje
−(λj−λk)θ, j, k = L,H.
If, without loss of generality, we consider λL > λH , then h
LH(θ) is a decreasing function, and therefore,
it violates condition (R). However, note that (IHR) is satisfied because the simple hazard rate functions
are constant and equal to 1/λk.
We can also compare Theorem 1 with Lemma 12 in Krähmer and Strausz (2014). In that Lemma,
they assume that hHH(θ) < hLL(θ), which implies θ̂L < θ̂H , and establish that a necessary condition
for the static contract to be optimal is to have the profit-to-rent ratio rLH(θ) being increasing at θ̂. Our
result contains this lemma because if rLH(·) were decreasing at θ̂, then we could always find θ1 < θ̂ and
θ2 > θ̂ such that
RLH(θ1, θ̂) > R
LH(θ̂, θ2).
Thus, (APR) does not hold, and therefore, the static contract would not be optimal. Figure 3 illustrates
how our condition (APR) closes the gap between those offered by Krähmer and Strausz (2015).
We can compare conditions (R) and (APR). Note that condition (R) implies the monotonicity of














≥ rLH(θ̂), ∀θ ≥ θ̂.
Hence, the result obtained by Krähmer and Strausz (2015) that if condition (R) holds then the static
contract is optimal follows as a corollary of Theorem 1. We highlight that while condition (R) implies
that the profit-to-rent ratios are increasing, our condition (APR) only implies the monotonicity of an
appropriately weighted average of the profit-to-rent ratios. This is sensible because we are dealing with
interim expected seller’s revenues and interim incentive compatibility constraints.
In terms of methodology, our approach differs from that of Krähmer and Strausz (2015). Their
approach consists of relaxing the low to high interim incentive constraint and then – by using their
condition (R) – they relax the monotonicity constraint and prove that the solution must be a threshold
schedule for each type. From there, they show that the threshold for the two types must be equal and,
therefore, that the static contract is optimal.
In our approach, we do not use a relaxation of the general formulation or impose conditions on
the primitives other than that the ratios rkk(θ) are nondecreasing. For the sufficiency, we construct a
Lagrangian relaxation with multipliers for the incentive compatibility constraints, but we do not relax
the monotonicity constraints. The multipliers relate to the profit-to-rent ratios at the static threshold
θ̂; they measure the change in the objective per unit of change in the constraints. Then, by leveraging
the result of Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) that an optimal contract is a threshold allocation, we prove
that under (APR), the solution to the relaxation is the static contract. The multipliers have a natural
structure: the low to high incentive constraint is slack, and for the high to low constraint, the change
in the objective is given by the ratio of the seller’s profit to the information rent of the high type. Once
the multipliers are set, however, the key to the proof is to establish that condition (APR) delivers the
optimality of the static contract.
5 Sequential Contracts
We now proceed to provide the complete characterization of the optimal sequential contract when the
necessary and sufficient condition associated with the static contract fails. As suggested in Section 4.2
and by Proposition 1, the optimal sequential contract provides a deterministic allocation to the high
type and, for mid-range values, it randomizes the low-type buyer (or, equivalently, reduces the quantity
allocated).
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5.1 The Structure of the Sequential Contract













s.t xk(θ) nondecreasing, ∀k ∈ {L,H}








The difference between (PR) and the original problem (P) is the omission of the incentive constraint for
the low-type to report truthfully. Importantly, we do not relax the monotonicity constraint. We obtain
a characterization of the optimal solution to (PR) as stated by the following theorem.
Proposition 3 (Relaxed Solution)
Suppose that rkk(θ) is nondecreasing for each k ∈ {L,H}. The optimal solution of (PR) has allocations
x?L(θ) ,

0 if θ < θ1,
xL if θ1 ≤ θ ≤ θ2,
1 if θ2 < θ;
x?H(θ) ,
0 if θ < θH ,1 if θH ≤ θ.








Note that if θ1 = θH , we would recover the static contract. Importantly, the optimal contract of
(PR) has the same structure as the profitable deviation to the static contract presented in Proposition
1. The only difference is that in the former, the threshold for the high type may not necessarily be equal
to θ̂ as in the latter. With this generalization, one can show that the proposed profitable deviation is
indeed optimal for (PR). The associated transfers are given by:
t?L(θ) =

0 if θ < θ1,
θ1 · xL if θ1 ≤ θ ≤ θ2,
θ2 − (θ2 − θ1) · xL if θ2 < θ;
t?H(θ) =
0 if θ < θH ,θH if θH ≤ θ.
We use an argument based on infinite dimensional linear programming (which may be of more
general interest by itself) to show that the extreme points of (PR) are step functions with at most one
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randomization step. We then use an improvement argument to show that the optimal contract of (PR)
only requires a simple threshold allocation without randomization for the high type.8
Further, consider a low-type allocation that randomizes within an interval [θa, θb]. Recall the argu-
ment in Section 4.3, where we found a revenue improvement while maintaining feasibility, in particular,
while maintaining the incentive constraint of the high type. Using a similar reasoning, we can show















= RLH(θ̃, θb). (10)
In general, this condition is not satisfied because the profit-to-rent ratio rLH(·) does not need to be a
nondecreasing function. Therefore, we cannot find a feasible improvement over the random allocation
contract, and hence, we cannot restrict attention to deterministic contracts for the low-type. In contrast,
a similar argument for the high type yields the expression RHH(θa, θ̃) ≤ RHH(θ̃, θb), which always holds
when rHH(·) is nondecreasing. Hence, we can restrict attention to a deterministic threshold contract
for the high type.
The discussion above again highlights the importance of the average profit-to-rent ratios in our
analysis, as they quantify revenue improvements while maintaining incentive compatibility. We can
now characterize the optimal sequential contract.
Theorem 2 (Optimal Sequential Contract)
Suppose that rkk(θ) is nondecreasing for each k ∈ {L,H}. The optimal sequential contract coincides
with the optimal solution of (PR) as given by Proposition 3.
In Proposition 3, we provided the characterization of the optimal solution to (PR). In the proof
of Theorem 2, we argue that the optimal solution to (PR) is feasible for (P) and thus optimal. In
turn, we obtain a full characterization of the optimal sequential contract in terms of three parameters
((θ1, θ2, θH) that we characterize in Lemma B-1 in the Appendix ). We note that the proof of the
theorem relies on the structure of x and the thresholds derived in Proposition 3. In turn, we do not
exploit any single crossing-like property (e.g., stochastic order) but solely the monotonicity of rkk(θ).
The sequential contract makes the low-type worse off and the high type better off with respect to
the contract the seller would offer if he could perfectly screen each type. For the low-type, that contract
would set a threshold equal to θ̂L and would always allocate the object when her value is above the
threshold. However, the sequential contract allocates the object to the low-type whenever her value is
8We thank an anonymous referee for a valuable suggestion regarding the proof technique.
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above θ1 ≥ θ̂L with positive probability. Therefore, the low type is worse off in two dimensions: she is
allocated the object less often and with less probability. On the other hand, the high type receives the
object more often and with certainty since θH ≤ θ̂H . A comparison of the thresholds of the optimal
static contract with those of the optimal screening contract is more subtle because the optimal static
contract may display nonmonotone behavior in the primitives. In the next section, we elaborate more
on this issue (c.f Figure 4).
5.2 The Exponential Example Continued
In Section 4.4, we studied the properties and structure of the optimal static contract for exponential
values. We now derive the optimal sequential contract for this environment.
Proposition 4 (Optimal Sequential Contract for Exponential Distributions)
If condition (9) fails, then the optimal allocation is:
x?L(θ) =
0 if θ < θ1,x if θ1 ≤ θ; and x?H(θ) =
0 if θ < θH ,1 if θH ≤ θ.


























This result follows from Theorem 2. We note that in the exponential case, we only have two intervals
for the low type’s allocation, and thus θ2 =∞. That is, the low-type is uniformly restricted to a quantity
below one for all realized values θ ≥ θ1.
We now illustrate our findings below and vary the difference in the mean between the low and high
type. Specifically, we fix αL to be 0.7 and λH to be 0.5, that is, the high type has mean 2. Since
we are assuming λL > λH , we consider λL = λH + δ with δ > 0. Figure 4 shows how the different
thresholds vary as δ increases or, equivalently, as the mean of the low-type decreases to zero. As we can
see, there is a value of δ (δ =0.93) to the left of which the static contract is optimal, and to its right,
the sequential contract is optimal. As suggested by Proposition 2, as δ increases, (λL − λH) increases,
and therefore, we expect it to be larger than 1/θ̂ (see Corollary 2 and Corollary 3). As δ increases, the
two distributions become more distant from each other, and there is a gain from screening the types.
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Figure 4: Optimal thresholds for static and sequential contracts when setting λL = λH+δ, with αL = 0.7
and λH = 0.5.
In terms of thresholds, we observe that for the static contract, θ̂ is initially decreasing and then it
increases getting closer to 1/λH = 2. This happens because as we increase δ, we are making 1/λL smaller.
However, at some point, this value becomes too small, and therefore, the probability of allocating the
object to a low type, P (value low-type > θ̂) = e−λLθ̂, will be so low that the seller would be better
off by choosing a threshold tailored for the high type, that is, close to 1/λH = 2. For the sequential
thresholds, the threshold for the low type is decreasing while that for the high type is increasing in δ.
As δ increases, the distributions become more different, and therefore, it is optimal to set thresholds
closer and closer to the threshold that a seller would set if he knew the types in advance, that is, 1/λL
and 1/λH .
We can also compare the different mechanisms in terms of the resulting revenue. The optimal
revenue for the sequential contract Πseq is given by:
Πseq = αL · x · θ1 · e−λLθ1 + αH · θH · e−λHθH .
Then, we can plot the different revenues as we vary δ. Figure 5 (left panel and thick line in right panel)
depicts the results. When αL is large, the static threshold θ̂ is tailored to the low types, so (9) holds for
more values of λL. As screening occurs when the mean of the low type is sufficiently small, and thus
δ is large, the revenue improvement due to sequential contracts becomes more significant and is above
40% when αL = 0.95. In recent work, Bergemann, Castro, and Weintraub (2020) compare the revenue
of the optimal third-degree price discrimination policy against a uniform pricing policy. The optimal
sequential screening policy is upper bounded by the third-degree pricing policy. As a corollary, they
establish that the sequential screening policy can yield at most twice the revenue of the uniform pricing
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policy under some regularity conditions (Corollary 3.3). By means of an example, one can show that






















Figure 5: Left: Optimal expected revenue for static and sequential. Right: Percentage improvement of
the sequential over the static contract. In both figures we set λL = λH + δ with λH = 0.5. In the left
figure, we set αL = 0.7, while in the right figure, αL takes values in {0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 0.95}.
5.3 Menu Implementation
Next, we discuss how the optimal sequential contract can be implemented in practice. By means of the
taxation principle, we can verify that the following menu of contracts is an indirect implementation of
our optimal mechanism:
• contract H: there is a single posted price of pH = θH ;
• contract L: the buyer can choose between two items:
(a) buy at a price of pL = θ1 · xL and be allocated with probability xL.
(b) buy at a price of pL = θ2 − (θ2 − θ1) · xL and be allocated with probability 1.
The prices in the above menu of contracts are set using the values in Proposition 3. This implemen-
tation offers a posted price to the high-type buyer and offers the low-type buyer two options. In option
(a), the low-type buyer can pay a low price, but this carries the possibility of not acquiring the item
or, equivalently, obtaining a reduced quantity; in (b), the low-type buyer pays a high price and always
obtains the object.
An appealing feature of the implementation is that if we regard allocations as quantities, then we
can order the per unit prices. In contract L, the per unit prices are θ1 and θ1 · xL + θ2 · (1− xL) for (a)
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and (b), respectively. Hence, the per unit price in (a) is less than or equal to that in (b). That is, the
low type in (a) receives less of the good but at a discounted price compared to the low type in (b). For
contract H, the per unit price is θH , and since θ1 is less than or equal to θH , the low type in (a) also
receives less of the good at a discounted price compared to the high-type buyer.
6 Extensions
In this section, we consider three extensions to our base model. First, we consider the case of multiple
interim types. Then, for two interim types, we study both a setting with weaker ex post IR constraints
and a three-stage setting.
6.1 Multiple Types
Thus far, we have studied the optimality of the static and sequential contract for two interim types.
In this section, we extend the analysis to an arbitrary number of interim types {1, . . . ,K} and in-
vestigate some properties of the solution to (P). In particular, we provide a generalized version of
condition (APR). Then, we provide numerical evidence and highlight the challenges associated with
the characterization of the optimal sequential mechanism when K > 2.
6.1.1 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition
Our generalized necessary and sufficient condition continues to rely on small variations in the objective
around the static solution. To this end, we consider the following set:
A ,
{
(λij)i,j∈{1,··· ,K}2 ≥ 0 :
∑
j 6=k










λjk, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
}
.
The set A contains the multipliers associated with the incentive constraints that encode the change
in the objective as we deviate from the optimal static allocation. Roughly speaking, when the static
contract is optimal, allocation perturbations in the contract of each type should equal the dualized costs
associated with such perturbations in the incentive constraints. In other words, the derivative of the
Lagrangian with respect to the posted price around the static solution equals zero. This is captured by
the set of equalities in the definition of A. In addition, the set of inequalities ensures that the optimal ex
post utilities of the lowest value buyers are zero. Note that multipliers being in the set A is a necessary
condition for optimality. The next result provides a necessary and sufficient condition.
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Theorem 3 (Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Finitely Many Types)
The set A is nonempty. If there exists a feasible solution to (P) that strictly satisfies all the incentive
























for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
The strict feasibility for (P) corresponds to the standard Slater condition. Condition (APRM ) is
obtained by analyzing the Lagrangian when the static contract is optimal and disentangling the key
conditions it must satisfy. To do, so we consider simple threshold deviations from the static contract
and study their impact on the Lagrangian. We note that this condition is easy to verify – it amounts
to minimizing a convex program. Indeed, both sides of the inequality in (APRM ) correspond to convex
(left) and concave (right) functions of λ. Their difference, left side minus right side, is thus a convex
function. Moreover, because we can always choose θ equal to θ̂ , this difference is always bounded
below by zero. Condition (APRM ) establishes that we can find λ such that this convex function equals
zero; that is, its minimum value equals zero. This can be readily verified by using, for example, a
subgradient-type method.
To obtain a better understanding of this condition, it is helpful to see how it generalizes the necessary
and sufficient condition provided in Theorem 1 for two types. The general condition of Theorem 3 turns




α1 ·R11(θ, θ̂)− λ21 ·
∫ θ̂






α1 ·R11(θ̂, θ)− λ21 ·
∫ θ








α2 ·R22(θ, θ̂)− λ12 ·
∫ θ̂






α2 ·R22(θ̂, θ)− λ12 ·
∫ θ




where λ12 and λ21 belong to A. We next argue that condition (APR) holds if and only if there exists
λ12, λ21 ∈ A such that conditions (12) and (13) hold. Suppose that (APR) holds. Since we expect the
incentive constraint of the low type not to be binding, we set λ12 equal to zero. Because λ must belong
to A, this necessarily implies that λ21 is equal to α1r12(θ̂). For this choice of multipliers, the inequality
(13) follows directly from the fact that rkk is increasing. Moreover, the choice of multipliers, together
with (APR), implies that both the maximum and the minimum in (12) are equal to zero. To see this
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consider the maximum in (12) and take θ = θ̂; since λ21 is equal to α1r
12(θ̂), the expression inside the
brackets is zero. Hence, the maximum in (12) is bounded below by zero. It is also bounded above by
zero:
α1 ·R11(θ, θ̂)− λ21 ·
∫ θ̂
θ F 2(z)dz∫ θ̂
θ F 1(z)dz
≤ 0⇔ R12(θ, θ̂) ≤ r12(θ̂), ∀θ ≤ θ̂.
When (APR) holds, the right-hand side inequality always holds. A similar argument applies to the
minimum. Therefore, the condition provided in Theorem 1 implies (APRM ) for the binary case. The
converse implication follows from a contradiction argument, which we omit for the sake of brevity.
The two-type case is amenable to this simplification because one can readily solve for the multipliers:
λ12 equal to zero is a natural choice, and λ21 = α1r
12(θ̂) then follows from the definition of A. Unfor-
tunately, when K > 2, the space of deviations is richer, and so is the possible selection of multipliers.
In turn, this precludes a transparent characterization as in the two-type case.
An appealing feature of (APRM ) is that it provides a practical and simple way to verify that for a
range of distributions, the static contract is optimal, as shown in the following result.
Proposition 5 (Alternative Sufficient Conditions)
Under the Slater condition of Theorem 3 and when either
(i) condition (R) holds or
(ii) z · fk(z) is nondecreasing for all k,
the static contract is optimal.
In the proposition above, we show that either (i) or (ii) implies condition (APRM ) and, consequently,
the optimality of the static contract (cf. Theorem 3). Roughly speaking, in the proof of the proposition,
we show that under (i) or (ii), for all types, an appropriate function is nondecreasing. This function
relates to the integrand in the numerator of the expression inside the maximum and minimum in
(APRM ). In turn, by leveraging this monotonicity property, we establish that the maximum equals the
minimum in (APRM ).
The conditions in Proposition 5 are very different in nature. Condition (i) is the same property
under which Krähmer and Strausz (2015) prove the optimality of the static contract (here, we provide
an alternative proof). This is a “cross” condition, in the sense that it links the distribution of different
interim types. It is satisfied when the density of each type is increasing, for example, for natural families
of distributions such as fk(z) = z
βk for some βk > 1 and z ∈ [0, 1]. Condition (ii) does not associate
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the distributions of different types—it is not a cross condition. This property is satisfied by some
truncated heavy-tailed distribution, for example, the log-normal distribution truncated between zero
and the exponential of the mean of its logarithmic value.
Theorem 3 provides a simple, easy-to-verify set of inequalities for the optimality of the static con-
tract with multiple types. By contrast, a complete characterization of the sequential contract seems
substantially more complex with finitely many types. Next, in the context of exponentially distributed
ex post types, we briefly describe partial results and highlight the challenges associated with multiple
types that already appear in the numerical analysis.
6.1.2 The Exponential Example Continued
Despite the challenges that we discussed above, we are able to provide the following result for the
exponential environment.
Proposition 6 (Structure of Sequential Contract with Exponential Distributions)
For exponential values, the optimal allocations have at most one randomized interval.
Proposition 6 establishes that for exponentially distributed values, the optimal contract is simple in
the sense that each interim type allocation is randomized in at most one interval. The proof proceeds by
establishing that the monotonicity constraints form a cone, using duality and complementary slackness.
It is worth mentioning that the proof method applies more generally, but the structure of the contract
in general depends on the values of the dual variables corresponding to the incentive constraints. In the
exponential case, the argument can be simplified to show that the simple structure in the result arises
independent of these variables’ values.
The characterization in Proposition 6 only establishes the structure of the optimal allocations; it
does not provide information on the number of contracts that the optimal solutions will ultimately
feature. For example, if K = 4, Proposition 6 does not say whether the optimal solution will pool the
interim types to create either one, two, three or four different contracts. In general, the full range of
contracts from static to fully sequential (K different contracts ) is possible.
To further explore the structure of optimal contracts, we provide numerical results. In Figure 6,
we depict the optimal allocations when K = 4 and all interim types have exponentially distributed
values. A first observation is that for different proportions αk of interim types, the optimal contract can
feature different levels of separation. Panel (a) of the figure corresponds to an optimal static contract
(no separation), and panel (d) corresponds to an optimal sequential contract that features a different
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Figure 6: Optimal allocations for K = 4; types have exponential distributions with means
(2.2, 5.0, 12, 50) (for numerical simplicity, we use truncated versions of these distributions in the in-
terval [0,60]). In each panel the vertical axis corresponds to buyers’ valuations, and the horizontal axis
corresponds to the interim type. Each bar represents the allocation for each type; lighter gray indicates
lower probability of allocation, while darker gray indicates a higher probability of allocation. White
represents no allocation and black full allocation. From panels (a) to (d) ,the fractions, αk, for each
type are (0.7, 0.2, 0.05, 0.05), (0.4, 0.1, 0.4, 0.1), (0.3, 0.2, 0.4, 0.1) and (0.25, 0.25, 0.1, 0.4), respectively.
depicted in Figure 6, only one, (d), has four contracts in the optimal solution. Finding the minimal
number of contracts that provides a good approximation of the optimal multiple-type sequential contract
is a question beyond the scope of this paper but may be of interest to study in the future.
Observe that across the instances in Figure 6, each optimal contract has at most one interval of
value for which randomization occurs (see Proposition 6). This simple structure of the optimal contract
does not appear robust to other specifications of the value distributions. When we consider the case
of normally distributed values (using truncated normal random variables), the optimal contract might
exhibit several different intervals of randomization for a given type. In general, richer contract features
may arise when we combine exponential, normal, uniform or other distributions. As a consequence,
generally speaking, it is challenging to analytically characterize the optimal solution. The challenge
here is that classic relaxation approaches, used in the mechanism design literature, do not apply in our
setting. For example, relaxing all the upward incentive constraints and leaving only the local downward
incentive constraints does not work because, in general, global downward incentive constraints bind.
Moreover, binding constraints are highly sensitive to model primitives. Improving our understanding
of this setting may be an interesting avenue for future research.
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6.2 Weaker Ex Post Participation Constraints
In this section, we generalize our base model and allow for less rigid participation constraints. Consider a
scenario in which the seller can ask the buyer to pay a nonrefundable amount upon signing the contract.
In this case, the contract must guarantee that the interim utility of the buyer is nonnegative, but the ex
post utility can be negative. Effectively, we are relaxing the ex post participation constraints. Krähmer
and Strausz (2015) refer to this type of contract as bonds because it is as if the buyer pays a costly bond
just before signing the contract. In this setting we can prove, using a similar argument to Theorem 1,
that if the nonrefundable payment is not too large, then our necessary and sufficient condition remains
valid.
Proposition 7 Let B > 0. Suppose that the buyer’s ex post utility must be greater or equal than −B
and that her interim utility is nonnegative. If mink∈{L,H}
∫ θ̄
θ̂ F k(z)dz ≥ B, then the static contract is
optimal if and only if condition (APR) is satisfied.
In the proposition, we consider the following participation constraints
uk ≥ −B and uk +
∫ θ̄
0
xk(z)F k(z)dz ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {L,H}. (14)
The proposition establishes that in this setting, when B is not too large, (APR) is still a necessary and
sufficient condition for the optimality of the static contract. Krähmer and Strausz (2015) prove a related
result that establishes the optimality of the static contract when B is small enough and condition (R)
is satisfied.9
6.3 A Three-Stage Model
As an extension of our base model, we also study a simple multi-stage setting in which buyers learn
progressive information about their valuations over time. In particular, we show that from an initial
condition in which the seller offers a static contract, as more information becomes available to the
buyers over time and the types become more separated, the seller may wait for this to sequentially
screen buyers.
Consider the following three-stage model. In the first stage, the buyer possesses imperfect informa-
tion about her type. In the second stage, the buyer learns precisely whether her type is low or high.
9Interestingly, one can also show that in the case
∫ θ̄
θ̂
FL(z)dz < B <
∫ θ̄
0
FL(z)dz, the optimal static contract may exhibit
randomization despite the absence of the interim IC constraints, but due to the presence of the interim IR constraint. We
omit the details for brevity.
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Later, in the third stage, the buyer learns her valuation. More precisely, in the first stage, the buyer
knows that her distribution is the mixture
βFL(·) + (1− β)FH(·), (15)
where β ∈ [0, 1] is also known by the seller. In the second stage, the buyer learns her type, and from
the seller’s perspective, there is a probability αL or (1− αL) that the buyer is of the low or high type,
respectively. That is, from the second stage on, the situation is exactly the same as in our original
model.
The seller can either decide to sell the item in the first stage or wait until the second stage. Any
contract the seller designs must respect ex post participation constraints. In the first stage, neither the
buyer nor the seller possesses private information about the buyer’s valuation of the item—both know
that it will be drawn from the mixture distribution in equation (15). In turn, the only contract that the
seller can offer in the first stage is a static contract without screening. The optimal ex post IR static
contract is a posted price against the mixture distribution. Now, the seller could also choose to wait
and offer a contract in the second stage. In this case, the buyer gains information because she effectively
knows her type while the seller only knows that the buyer is of the low type with probability αL (and
of high type with probability (1 − αL). The optimal contract in this case can be static or sequential
depending on the parameters as characterized by condition (APR).
At this point, it is possible for us to assess whether the seller would prefer to offer a static contract in
the first stage or to wait and screen in the second stage. Interestingly, it might be optimal for the seller
to wait until the second stage despite that the buyer becomes more informed. Suppose that β = αL.
In this case, the static contracts in the first and second stages coincide. As a result, if (APR) is not
satisfied, waiting for the second stage to screen the buyer becomes optimal. In contrast, if (APR) holds,
then there is no point in waiting, and offering the static contract in the first stage is optimal. From
this, it follows that if αL and β are different but close to each other, it might indeed be strictly optimal
for the seller to wait until the second stage to screen the buyer.
7 Conclusion
We considered the scope of sequential screening in the presence of ex post participation constraints.
The ex post participation constraints limit the ability of the seller to extract surplus from the buyer.
As the buyer has to be willing to participate in the contractual arrangement following every realization
of her value, the surplus has to be extracted ex post rather than at the interim level.
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Despite these ex post restrictions, sequential screening frequently allows the seller to increase his
revenue beyond the statically optimal revenue. The gains from sequential screening become more pro-
nounced to the extent that the interim types differ in their willingness to pay. A natural implementation
of the optimal mechanism simply offers the buyer the choice among different menus in the first stage.
The choice of menu in the first period merely restricts the possible choices in the second period. In
particular, it is not necessary to ask the buyer for any transfer before the final transaction occurs.
Moreover, the buyer only has to make a transfer if she receives the object.
In contrast to the static solution where an optimal policy is always to sell the maximum quantity
of 1, the sequential screening policy offers intermediate quantities. This departure from the bang-bang
policy in a linear utility setting arises due to the presence of the ex post participation constraint, in
conjunction with the incentive compatibility constraints.
There are several natural directions to extend the present work. Our stronger results were for the
case of binary interim types while allowing for a continuum of values for each type. We also presented
an extension of Theorem 1 to multiple types, as well as a characterization and numerical results for
exponential values. We would like to further explore the characterization of the optimal sequential
contract to multiple types and general value distributions. An interesting question here concerns the
number of randomization intervals per type and whether the number of intermediate allocations increases
with the number of interim types. Additionally, is there a fixed number of intermediate allocations that
yield a good approximation to the optimal solution for an arbitrary number of interim types? Similarly,
is there a fixed number of contracts that yield a good approximation to the optimal solution for an
arbitrary number of interim types?
We might also be interested in analyzing how the number of competing buyers may affect the nature
of the optimal mechanism. This has important practical consequences, particularly in industries that
use market mechanisms such as auctions, for example, in the case of display advertising alluded to at
the beginning of the paper. We note that this extension is not immediate because with multiple buyers,
we may lose the threshold structure of the optimal static allocation. However, we conjecture that in this
case, an approximately optimal market design would consist of running a series of “waterfall auctions”
with different priorities across participants.
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A Appendix: Proofs of Main Results
The appendix contains the proof of all results except for those related to the exponential distributions
that are contained in the supplementary appendix B.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof of this result is standard and thus omitted.
Proof of Lemma 2. The fact that the optimal solution is a threshold allocation is explained in the
main text. Thus, we only need to provide a proof of θ̂ being in the interval [θ̂1, θ̂K ]; however, this is
exactly Lemma 1 in Krähmer and Strausz (2014).
Proof of Theorem 1. We first show the sufficiency of our condition and then its necessity. We
denote by Ω the space of nondecreasing allocations, that is,
Ω , {x : [0, θ̄]→ [0, 1] : x(·) is nondecreasing}.
Sufficiency. We assume that condition (APR) holds. We want to verify that the static contract is
optimal. In order to do so we dualize the incentive constraints. The Lagrangian is

















where wL, wH correspond to the multipliers for the ex post IR constraints, and λ ∈ {λHL, λLH} to the
multipliers for the incentive constraints. In the Lagrangian above we have chosen the multipliers as
follows
wL = αL − αHrHH(θ̂), wH = αH + αHrHH(θ̂), λHL = αLrLH(θ̂), λLH = 0, (A-1)
these multipliers are nonnegative because rHH(θ̂) ≤ 0, rLH(θ̂) ≥ 0 and
wH = αH + αHr




(θ̂)⇔ θ̂ ≥ 0.
Hence, maximizing the Lagrangian over nondecreasing allocation xL and xH yields an upper bound
for the relaxed problem. Note that this choice of multipliers (together with equation (A-4) below)
eliminates the uL and uH terms in the Lagrangian. We next show that under (APR) the solution to

















To prove this, first note that the optimal solution xL on the left-hand side of (A-2) must be of the
threshold type, that is, xL(θ) = 1{θ≥θ?}, because xL(·) is nondecreasing (see, e.g., Myerson (1981) or











dz, ∀θ? ∈ [0, 1].
Replacing the value of λHL, this equation can be cast over values θ
?











, ∀θ?1 ≤ θ̂ ≤ θ?2 (A-3)
Condition (APR) ensures that the equation above always holds. Indeed, condition (APR) implies that












Taking ε ↓ 0 yields the left-hand side inequality in (A-3). The right-hand side inequality in (A-3) can
be verified using an analogous argument. This shows (A-2), that is, the static contract maximizes the
part of the Lagrangian that corresponds to interim type L. We now prove the same for type H. Note
first that the optimality of the static contract implies
λHL = αLr







































where in (a) we have used the definition of rHH(·) and in (b) our assumption that rHH(·) is increasing.
Since the value of the Lagrangian coincides with the primal objective at the static solution, and this
solution is always primal feasible, we conclude that the static contract is optimal.
Necessity. We defer this proof to the proof of Proposition 1. In it, we show that whenever condition
(APR) is not satisfied, there is a contract different from the static one with a strictly larger revenue.
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Proof of Proposition 1. Assume that (APR) does not hold; then, by Lemma A-1 (which we state














Consider a contract in which we set uL = uH = 0, and
xL(θ) =

0 if θ < θ1
x if θ1 ≤ θ ≤ θ2
1 if θ2 < θ,
xH(θ) =







FH(z)dz. We next show that this solution is feasible and yields a strict
revenue improvement over the static contract.
Feasibility. The ex post participation constraints are clearly satisfied. Additionally, since θ1 < θ̂ <










































note that we are using here that by Lemma A-1 the denominator on the right-hand side is strictly
A-3






















































note that we are using here that by Lemma A-1 the denominator on the left-hand side is strictly positive.
This inequality together with (A-7) yields (A-6), and therefore, the proposed solution is feasible.
Revenue improvement. We need to prove that∫ θ̄
θ̂




































which is exactly the property satisfied by θ1, θ2 in (A-5).
Lemma A-1 Suppose that
max
0≤θ≤θ̂
RLH(θ, θ̂) > min
θ̂≤θ≤θ̄
RLH(θ̂, θ).



















Proof of Lemma A-1. Note that both RLH(·, θ̂) and RLH(θ̂, ·) are continuous functions. Thus
the maximum and the minimum in the statement are achieved by some θ̃a ∈ [0, θ̂] and θ̃b ∈ [θ̂, θ̄],
respectively. Therefore, by assumption, we have that
RLH(θ̃a, θ̂) > R
LH(θ̂, θ̃b).
Using the continuity of both functions, we can find θa < θ̂ and θb > θ̂ such that the inequality above is
satisfied.




LH(z)dz. Note that since θb > θ̂ ≥ θ̂L (see Lemma 2) we
have RLH(θ̂, θb) > 0. Therefore, R
LH(θa, θ̂) > 0, which implies the desired inequalities.
Extreme points. We next show that the extreme points in the feasible set of (PR) are step functions
with at most one intermediate step for the low and high type. We follow notation and definitions from
Anderson and Nash (1987).
Let us define the convex cone
P , {x(θ) : [0, θ̄]→ R+ : x(θ) is a nondecreasing function}.
We consider P to be a subset of X—the set of Lebesgue-measurable functions defined in [0, θ̄] taking
values in R+. Let the relation ≥P be defined by y ≥P x if and only if y − x ∈ P , for x, y ∈ X. We use
0X to denote the null vector in X. Furthermore, define the linear functionals




A2 : X → R, x 7→ x(θ̄).
Under this notation the feasible set in (PR) is
xL, xH ∈ X, xL, xH ≥P 0X , uL, uH ≥ 0, uH +A1xH ≥ uL+A1xL, A2xk ≤ 1, k ∈ {L,H}. (A-8)
Note that to study the extreme points of the set above, we can simply focus on either xL or xH . For
example, we can analyze the set {x ∈ X : x ≥P 0X , A1x ≥ C, A2x ≤ 1} for some constant C. Indeed,
note that
∃xL, xH ∈ X : uH+A1xH ≥ uL+A1xL ⇐⇒ ∃(t, xL, xH) ∈ R×X×X : A1xL+uL ≤ t,−A1xH−uH ≤ −t.
In turn, we can fix t and uL, uH and obtain two decoupled problems for xL and xH for which the feasible
sets are
FL , {x ∈ X : x ≥P 0X , A1x ≤ t−uL, A2x ≤ 1} and FH , {x ∈ X : x ≥P 0X , A1x ≥ t−uH , A2x ≤ 1},
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respectively. From this, it follows that the extreme points in the feasible set of (PR) correspond to the
extreme points of FL and FH . We have the following result.
Lemma A-2 Fix t and uL, uH , if x is an extreme point of FL or FH then
x(θ) ,

0 if θ < θ1,
χ if θ1 ≤ θ ≤ θ2,
1 if θ2 < θ,
for χ ∈ [0, 1] and 0 ≤ θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ θ̄.
Proof. We next prove the above result from first principles. We only provide a proof for FH ; the
proof for FL is analogous and thus omitted. Let C = t− uH . We argue that the extreme points of the
expanded set
F̃H = {(x, s, r) ∈ X × R× R : x ≥P 0X , s, r ≥ 0, A2x+ s = 1, A1x− r = C},
correspond to step functions with at most one intermediate step, s = 0 and r ≥ 0.
Since we added slack variables, s and r, we need to consider an expanded cone: P̃ = P ×R+ ×R+.
We also define the expanded linear functional Ã by (x, s, r) 7→ (A2x+ s,A1x− r). For any (x, s, r) ∈ P̃
define
B((x, s, r)) , {(ξ, η, ρ) ∈ X × R2 : (x, s, r) + λ(ξ, η, ρ) ∈ P̃ , (x, s, r)− λ(ξ, η, ρ) ∈ P̃ for some scalar λ > 0},
N(Ã) , {(ξ, η, ρ) ∈ X × R2 : A2ξ + η = 0, A1ξ − ρ = 0}.
By Theorem 2.2 in Anderson and Nash (1987), we have that (x, s, r) is an extreme of point F̃H if and
only if B((x, s, r)) ∩ N(Ã) = {(0X , 0, 0)}. Therefore, to characterize the extreme points, it suffices to
characterize the points (x, s, r) ∈ F̃H that make the latter property true. Fix (x, s, r) ∈ F̃H ; then,
(ξ, η, ρ) ∈ B((x, s, r)) ∩N(Ã) if and only if there exists λ > 0 such that
x+ λξ, x− λξ ∈ P, s+ λη, s− λη ≥ 0, ξ(θ̄) + η = 0, (A-9)
and
r + λρ, r − λρ ≥ 0,
∫ θ̄
0
ξ(θ)F̄H(θ)dθ = ρ. (A-10)
First, note that because (x, s, r) ∈ F̃H , we have





There are two cases, r > 0 and r = 0. Consider first the case r > 0. If x is not a step function, we
analyze two subcases: (1) x is strictly increasing and continuous in some interval [θ1, θ2], or (2) x has
two consecutive intermediate steps.
Suppose that we are in (1); by the mean value theorem, there exists θm ∈ (θ1, θ2) such that x(θm) =
(x(θ+1 ) + x(θ
−










2 )− x(θ)) if [θm, θ2),
(A-11)
and we set ρ =
∫ θ̄
0 ξ(θ)F̄H(θ)dθ and λ small enough such that r+λρ, r−λρ ≥ 0 (this is possible because
r > 0). Note that ξ 6= 0X but (ξ, η, ρ) satisfies conditions (A-9) and (A-10). In turn, no extreme point
can be such that is strictly increasing in an interval. Now consider (2), that is, x is such that there are
two consecutive intervals in which it takes different and strictly positive values. That is, x(θ) equals χ1
in (θ1, θ2) and χ2 in (θ2, θ3) with χ1 < χ2 and x(θ
−
1 ) < χ1. We can set η = 0 and ξ(θ) = 1{θ∈[θ1,θ2)}
ρ =
∫ θ̄
0 ξ(θ)F̄H(θ)dθ; and let λ1 be small enough such that r + λρ, r − λρ ≥ 0. We consider λ equal
to min{λ1, χ1 − x(θ−1 ), χ2 − χ1}/2 (here we are assuming, without loss of generality, that x is right
continuous). Again, note that ξ 6= 0X but (ξ, η, ρ) satisfies conditions (A-9) and (A-10). Now, suppose
that x(θ) has a single step, that is, x(θ) = χ1{θ≥θ1}. Any ξ that satisfies condition (A-9) must equal
zero for θ ≤ θ1 and it must be constant in [θ1, θ̄]. Note that (x, s, r) ∈ F̃H then χ+ s = 1, in turn, this
means that if η satisfies condition (A-9) then η ∈ [−1−χλ ,
1−χ
λ ]. Therefore, if χ < 1 it is possible to find
(ξ, η, ρ) 6= (0X , 0, 0) that verify conditions (A-9) and (A-10). In turn, the only possible extreme points
of F̃H are such that χ = 1. We have thus proved that the extreme points of FH correspond to step
functions for the first case r > 0.
For the second case, suppose that r = 0. In turn, condition (A-10) becomes ρ = 0 and
∫ θ̄
0 ξ(θ)F̄H(θ)dθ =
0. Suppose that x is strictly increasing and continuous in some interval (θ1, θ2). Consider some
θm ∈ (θ1, θ2) (to be defined precisely later), and consider θa, θb such that θa ≤ θm ≤ θb and
x(θa) =
x(θ+1 ) + x(θm)
2
and x(θb) =
x(θ−2 ) + x(θm)
2
. (A-12)
Given this we can define ξ to be equal to zero outside (θ1, θ2) and
ξ(θ) =

x(θ)− x(θ+1 ) if θ ∈ (θ1, θa];
x(θm)− x(θ) if θ ∈ [θa, θb];
x(θ)− x(θ−2 ) if θ ∈ [θb, θ2).
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Note that for λ = 1 we have
x(θ) + λξ(θ) =

2x(θ)− x(θ+1 ) if θ ∈ (θ1, θa];
x(θm) if θ ∈ [θa, θb];




x(θ+1 ) if θ ∈ (θ1, θa];
2x(θ)− x(θm) if θ ∈ [θa, θb];
x(θ−2 ) if θ ∈ [θb, θ2).
Note that ξ 6= 0X but (ξ, η) satisfies condition (A-9), with η = 0. Therefore, we only need to verify
condition (A-10), that is,
∫ θ̄
0 ξ(θ)F̄H(θ)dθ = 0. We show that this condition can be satisfied by judi-
ciously choosing θm as follows. Given our current definition of ξ, the second part of condition (A-10) is
equivalent to∫ θa
θ1










(x(θ)− x(θ−2 ))FH(θ)dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
L3(θm)
= 0, (A-13)
where each term above is a function of θm(because θa and θb are functions of θm) and continuous. Let




2 . Note that L1(θ
+
1 ) = 0, and
L2(θ
+





(x(θ+1 )− x(θ))FH(θ)dθ +
∫ θ2
θr
(x(θ)− x(θ−2 ))FH(θ)dθ < 0. (A-14)
We also have that L3(θ
−
2 ) = 0, and
L1(θ
−





(x(θ)− x(θ+1 ))FH(θ)dθ +
∫ θ2
θr
(x(θ−2 )− x(θ))FH(θ)dθ > 0. (A-15)
In turn, there must exist θm for which Eq. (A-13) holds. In conclusion, this rules out allocations x that
are strictly increasing in some interval as possible extreme points. We next consider the case in which
there are two consecutive intermediate steps.
Consider x(θ) equal to χ1 in (θ1, θ2) and χ2 in (θ2, θ3) with χ1 < χ2, x(θ
−
1 ) < χ1 and χ2 < x(θ
+
3 ).
Without loss of generality, we can assume that θ1 > 0 and θ3 < θ̄(if this is not satisfied, then we can
apply a similar argument to the one we present next). We can consider
ξ(θ) =




2 } if θ ∈ (θ1, θ2);
ξ2 ·min{x(θ−3 )− χ2,
(χ2−χ1)
2 } if θ ∈ [θ2, θ3),
(A-16)
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where the constants ξ1 ∈ (0, 1) and ξ2 ∈ (−1, 0) are defined in such a way that
∫ θ̄
0 ξ(θ)F̄H(θ)dθ = 0. In
turn, ξ 6= 0X but (ξ, η, ρ) satisfy conditions (A-9) and (A-10), with η = ρ = 0. This shows that there
are no extreme points such that there are two intermediate steps χ1, χ2 ∈ (0, 1).
Next, assume that there is only one such intermediate step as in the statement of the lemma. In
turn, s = 0 which implies that η = 0 and that we must have ξ(θ̄) = 0. Moreover, any ξ that satisfies
condition (A-9) must be constant in [0, θ1), [θ1, θ2) and [θ2, θ̄]). In turn, ξ(θ) equals zero in both [0, θ1)
and (θ2, θ̄], and equals some constant ξ1 in (θ1, θ2). But condition (A-10) requires
∫ θ̄
0 ξ(θ)F̄H(θ)dθ = 0
which in turn implies that ξ1 = 0. In conclusion, ξ(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ [0, θ̄]. We have thus proved
that the extreme points of F̃H correspond to step functions with at most one intermediate step. This
concludes the proof of the lemma that characterizes the extreme points of FH .
We note that in the case of K > 2 interim types, we can show using a similar argument based
on extreme points that in a model with finitely many ex post valuations, one can restrict attention
to contracts that have at most 2(K − 1) intermediate (randomized) step.10 We believe that by using
arguments similar to Winkler (1988) one may be able to extend this argument for K > 2 types to
the setting of continuous valuation distributions, but this may require additional technical arguments
that may be worth exploring in future work. More broadly, we believe that the results based on infinite
dimensional linear programming presented here and their possible extensions may be of separate interest
in mechanism design.
Proof of Proposition 3.
We separate this proof into two parts. In part 1 we show that the optimal solution has the structure
in the statement of the theorem. Note that it is enough to provide a proof for the structure of the
allocation, the transfers can be readily derived from Lemma 1. In part 2 we derive the properties about
the thresholds, xL and uH and uL.
Part 1. First we argue that we can restrict attention to allocations that randomize each type in at
most one connected interval. Then we show that for the high type there is no need for a randomized
allocation.
According to Theorem 2.5 in Anderson and Nash (1987), the optimal solution to (PR), which is an
infinite dimensional linear program, is achieved at an extreme point. In turn, we must argue that the
extreme points in the feasible set of (PR) are step functions with at most one intermediate step for the
low and high types. However, this follows immediately from Lemma A-2, which we state and prove
immediately before the present proof on pages A-5 and A-6.
10Note that in the case of K = 2, we only have one constraint because we can show that we can relax the low type’s IC
constraint.
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To conclude Part 1 of the proof, we show that for the high type, the intermediate step can be
eliminated. Suppose x?H(·) is an optimal solution to (PR) for which there exists θ1 < θ2 and 0 < x < 1









Consider the following deviation xdevH which coincides with x
?






1 ) if θ ∈ (θ1, θ1 + ε1)
x?H(θ) if θ ∈ [θ1 + ε1, θ2 − ε2]
x?H(θ
+
2 ) if θ ∈ (θ2 − ε2, θ2)
for some ε1, ε2 > 0. We can set ε1 and ε2(ε1) such that x
dev

























+). Note that this equation defines ε2(ε1). Also, ε2(ε1) defined in this
way is strictly increasing. Moreover, the values that ε2(ε1) can take are limited by θ2− ε2(ε1) ≥ θ1 + ε1,
that is, the integration interval in the middle term on the left-hand side of (A-17) must be well defined
(such that the integral is nonnegative). Therefore, the function ε2(ε1) is always bounded above by
θ2 − θ1 − ε1. The unique ε?1 such that these two functions are equal, ε2(ε?1) = θ2 − θ1 − ε?1, represents
the upper limit in the domain of ε2(ε1). Note that at this point the middle term on the left-hand side
of (A-17) vanishes.
Taking the derivative in (A-17) with respect to ε1 yields the following:
ε′2(ε1) =
(x− x−H)FH(θ1 + ε1)
(x+H − x)FH(θ2 − ε2)
. (A-18)
The change in profit for the seller is (proportional to)












= (x−H − x)µH(θ1 + ε1)fH(θ1 + ε1) + (x
+




= (x−H − x)FH(θ1 + ε1)
[
µH(θ1 + ε1)fH(θ1 + ε1)
FH(θ1 + ε1)
− µH(θ2 − ε2)fH(θ2 − ε2)
FH(θ2 − ε2)
]
= (x−H − x)FH(θ1 + ε1)
[
rHH(θ1 + ε1)− rHH(θ2 − ε2)
]
Because rHH is nondecreasing and (x−H − x) < 0, this expression is (weakly) positive. In turn, we
can conclude that by moving from ε1 = 0 to ε1 = ε
?
1 we obtain a weak revenue improvement. Since at
A-10
ε?1 the intermediate step, x, vanishes, we obtain the desired result. This completes the proof for interim
type 2 and case (2).
In conclusion, we can always consider x?H to be a threshold allocation as in the statement of the
proposition.














s.t x ∈ [0, 1], θ1 ≤ θ2











We prove the properties satisfied by uL, θ1, θH and θ2. From the formulation above it is clear that is
always optimal to set uL = 0. To see that θ̂L ≤ θ1 suppose the opposite, that is, θ̂L > θ1. This implies
that between θ1 and θ̂1, µL(·) is negative. Then, we can increase θ1 while maintaining feasibility and,
simultaneously, increasing the objective function. Note that this argument is also valid when θ1 = θ2.
Additionally, note that we can obtain a strict improvement only when x > 0; however, when x = 0
we can only obtain a weak improvement. In either case, we can always consider θ̂L ≤ θ1. To see that
θH ≤ θ̂H , suppose the opposite, θH > θ̂H . Since µH(θ) > 0 for all θ ≥ θ̂H , we can can decrease θH and
obtain an objective improvement while maintaining feasibility.











otherwise, we could decrease uH and, by doing so, improve the objective. Since uH > 0, equation (A-19)
yields

























which implies ∫ θ1
θH
FH(z)dz < 0,
a contradiction. Thus, θ1 < θH .
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Now consider a new contract for type H that consists of decreasing the cutoff θH by ε > 0 sufficiently
small, but at the same time maintaining the equality in equation (A-19). Specifically, let θH(ε) =











Note that by taking ε small we still have uH(ε) > 0. We claim that this new contract, characterized by
θ1, θ2, x, θH(ε) and uH(ε), yields a larger value than the old contract, characterized by θ1, θ2, x, θH and






















We obtain a similar expression for the new contract’s objective. Specifically, the first two terms in the
expression above are the same and the third term differs in θH . Hence, the new contract yields an






Since θH(ε) < θH this last inequality is true. Thus, if uH > 0 we can always construct a new contract
yielding a larger objective value and, therefore, at any optimal contract we must have uH = 0.





















which implies that θH = θ2, a contradiction.
Next, we argue that θ1 ≤ θH . First, we show that θ1 ≤ θ̂H . Suppose the opposite, that is, θ1 > θ̂H .
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That is, the incentive constraint is not binding. Therefore, since θ1 > θ̂H ≥ θ̂L, we can slightly decrease
θ1 and, in this way, obtain an objective improvement whenever x > 0. When x = 0, because θ2 ≥ θ1,
we can decrease θ2 and obtain an objective improvement as well. Hence, at any optimal solution we
must have θ1 ≤ θ̂H .









Using that θ1 ≤ θ̂H implies θH < θ̂H , we can slightly increase θH (maintaining feasibility) and thus
obtain an objective improvement. In conclusion, at any optimal solution, we must have θ1 ≤ θH .






FH(z)dz. Indeed, since θ̂L ≤ θ, the part of the
objective that involves x is always nonnegative and, therefore, it is optimal to make x as large as possible.








Proof of Theorem 2. We next show that the solutions to the relaxed problem and the original
problem coincide. It is enough to show that the solution of (PR) is feasible in (P). From Proposition 3



























Let θ1, θH , θ2 and x be the optimal solution to (PdR). If this solution corresponds to the optimal static
contract or yields the same objective as it, we are done because this contract is always feasible in (P).
If this solution is different from the optimal static contract and yields a strictly larger objective, it must












This is true because the contract (u1, u2, x1, x2) = (0, 0,1{θ≥θH},1{θ≥θH}) is a feasible static contract,
and therefore, its associated revenue is bounded by that of the optimal static contract. From the














Also, since x ≤ 1 we must have θ1 < θH . Note that since θ̂L ≤ θ1 < θ2 the denominator above is strictly
positive.
Now we argue that the contract optimizing (PdR) characterized by θ1, θH , θ2 and x is feasible for (P).
Since the high to low incentive constraint is satisfied, we only need to verify the low to high incentive
constraint. That is, we need to verify the following inequality
construct a new contract that is feasible for (Pd) and yields a strictly larger objective value than
the optimal static contract. In fact, this new contract is the one that optimizes (PdR). Therefore, we
only need to check feasibility. Since the high to low IC constraint is satisfied we need to verify the low

















FL(z)dz. In order to see why (A-23) holds, observe that from






























































Using this, together with equation (A-22), delivers equation (A-23). This concludes the proof .
Lemma A-3 Let θi ∈ [0, θ̄] for i = 1, 2, 3 be such that θ1 < θ2 < θ3. Additionally, consider functions


































































































s.t xk(θ) nondecreasing, ∀k ∈ {L,H}




xk(z)F k(z)dz ≥ uk′ +
∫ θ̄
0




xk(z)F k(z)dz ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {L,H},
To prove that (APR) implies the optimality of the static contract we consider (PB) and relax the
interim IR constraint. The resulting problem is the same as the original screening problem (P) except
for the change that uk ≥ −B. Then by following the same exact steps in the sufficiency part of the
proof of Theorem 1 the implication follows.
Now for the reverse implication, if (APR) does not hold when the static contract is optimal then it
is possible to construct a dynamic contract as in the proof of Proposition 1 that gives a strict revenue
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improvement. The only subtlety is that now we must verify that the constraint uk+
∫ θ̄
0 x(z)F k(z)dz ≥ 0
is satisfied for k ∈ {L,H}. This can be readily verified, following the notation in the proof of Proposition







FL(z)dz ≥ B (A-25)
which is true because we are assuming mink∈{L,H}
∫ θ̄


























but note that since
∫ θ̄
θ̂ FL(z)dz ≥ mink∈{L,H}
∫ θ̄

















θ̂ FL(z)dz ≥ B, the static contract is optimal if and only if (APR) holds, that is,
Theorem 1 still holds.
Proof of Theorem 3. In Lemma A-4 (which we state and prove after this proof) we show that A is
nonempty. Next, we prove the necessary and sufficient condition.
We prove both directions separately. First we show that if there exists λ ∈ A satisfying the properties
then the static contract is optimal. Then we show that if the static contract is optimal then we can
always solve for λ satisfying the properties.
Define
Ω , {x : [0, θ̄] −→ [0, 1] : x(·) is nondecreasing}, and ΩK , Ω× · · · × Ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
K times
.
For the first part we use a Lagrangian relaxation approach. That is, we dualize the incentive constraints
for a specific set of multipliers. This gives an upper bound to the seller’s problem. Then we show that































where λ correspond to the multipliers associated with the incentives, and w to the multipliers associated
with the ex post IR constraints. Let us define λ to be equal to the (λij)i,j∈{1,··· ,K}2 we are assuming to
exist, that is λ ∈ A, and let






λkj , ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. (A-29)
Note that by our choice of λ (λ ∈ A), wk is nonnegative for all k. With this choice of w the first
summation in the Lagrangian becomes zero. Now, we need to show that for this choice of multipliers




































Note that the RHS of (A-30), for each k, is maximized at some threshold contract θk ∈ [0, 1]. To prove
that (A-31) is an upper bound of (A-30) is enough to show that for all k and for any θk ∈ [0, 1]∫ θ̄
θk
(






















































dz, ∀θk ≥ θ̂,



































dz, ∀θk ≤ θ̂,
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In summary, proving that (A-32) holds is equivalent to showing that both (A-33) and (A-34) hold. To












θ̂ F j(z)dz∫ θ
θ̂ F k(z)dz
=
αk · µk(θ̂) · fk(θ̂)−
∑









where the last equality comes from the choice of the multipliers. Since the limit is taken for values

























































Since we are assuming that the minimum is an upper bound to the maximum above, we can conclude
that both (A-33) and (A-34) hold (with equality). This concludes the proof for the first direction.
For the second direction we need to show that if the static contract is optimal then we can find
λ satisfying condition (APRM ). Theorem 1 in Luenberger (1969, p. 217) gives then the existence of
Lagrange multipliers such that the static contract maximizes the Lagrangian(here we use the interior
point condition in the assumptions). In other words, ∃λ,w ≥ 0 such that
L(xs,0,λ,w) ≥ L(x,u,λ,w), ∀u,x ∈ RK+ × ΩK . (A-36)















, ∀u ∈ RK+ .
Which implies that






λjk = 0, ∀k,
A-18








as required. Now, fix k and consider a solution x ∈ ΩK such that xj , xs for all j 6= k and xk is 1{θ≥θk}
for some θk ∈ [0, 1]. Then equation (A-36) delivers equation (A-32). And we already saw that (A-32)





































that is, condition (APRM ) holds for any k. We only need to check that λ ∈ A. Observe that both the
maximum and the minimum are bounded from below and above (respectively) by
αk · µk(θ̂) · fk(θ̂)−
∑
j:j 6=k λjk · F j(θ̂)
F k(θ̂)
. (A-37)
To see this, we can take the limit as before. For the maximum we take the limit of θ approaching θ̂
from below. This limit converges to the expression in (A-37) and is bounded above by the maximum.
The same argument applies to the minimum but this time taking the limit from above θ̂. This in turn
implies that
αk · µk(θ̂) · fk(θ̂)−
∑








and we can conclude that λ ∈ A.
Lemma A-4 The set B ⊂ A defined by
B ,
{
(λij)i,j∈{1,··· ,K}2 ≥ 0 :
∑
j 6=k







λkj , ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
}
,
is non-empty. Hence, the set A is non-empty.
Proof of Lemma A-4. We want to show that B 6= ∅, which amount to proving that the linear system
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
λjk · F j(θ̂) = αk · µk(θ̂) · fk(θ̂) + F k(θ̂) ·
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
λkj , ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
αk = wk +
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
λkj ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
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with (λ,w) ≥ 0 has a solution. We begin by writing down the system with matrices and then we apply
Farkas’ lemma.
First, the vector λ is given by
(λ12, λ13, · · · , λ1K︸ ︷︷ ︸
Type1
, λ21, λ23, · · · , λ2K︸ ︷︷ ︸
Type2
, · · · , λK1, λK2, · · · , λKK−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
TypeK
).
Note that the terms λkk for any k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} do not form part of the vector. Now, consider matrix
A with K(K − 1) +K columns and 2K rows given by
A =
F1 F2 · · · FK 0K×K
B1 B2 · · · BK IK×K
 ,
where 0K×K is the zero matrix of dimension K × K and IK×K is the identity matrix of dimension
K ×K. Furthermore, Fk and Bk are matrices of dimension K × (K − 1) defined by
Fkij =

−F k(θ̂) if i = k
F k(θ̂) if i < k, j = i
F k(θ̂) if i > k, j = i− 1
0 if o.w,
Bkij =
1 if i = k0 if o.w.
Finally, let b be a vector defined by b = (αLµ1(θ̂)f1(θ̂), α2µ2(θ̂)f2(θ̂), · · · , αKµK(θ̂)fK(θ̂), αL, · · · , αK).




 = b, λ,w ≥ 0.
Now we use Farkas’ lemma, if this system does not have a solution then it must be the case that the




 ≥ 0, bᵀ ·
yF
yB
 < 0. (A-38)
Explicitly, we have (yF , yB) solve
F k(θ̂) · (yFj − yFk ) + yBk ≥ 0, ∀k, ∀j 6= k
yBk ≥ 0, ∀k
K∑
k=1
αkµk(θ̂)fk(θ̂) · yFk +
K∑
k=1
αk · yBk < 0.
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Let yFm be equal to mink{yFk } (m is the index that achieves the minimum) then
K∑
k=1

















θ̂ − F k(θ̂)
fk(θ̂)
)







































a contradiction. Where in (a) we use the fact that
∑K
k=1 αkµk(θ̂)fk(θ̂) = 0, in (b) we use the definition
of yFm, and in (c) we use the first set of equations in (A-38).




j 6=k λjkF j(z)
F k(z)
. (A-39)
We next show that under any of the two conditions in the statement of the proposition we can always
find λ ∈ A such that (APRM ) holds. To prove this, it is enough to verify that (a) Lk(z) ≤ Lk(θ̂) for all
z ≤ θ̂, and (b) Lk(z) ≥ Lk(θ̂) for all z ≥ θ̂, for some suitable λ ∈ A, for all k. Indeed, if such λ exists
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which is precisely (APRM ). The first inequality above comes from (a) and the second from (b).
To conclude we next verify conditions (a) and (b). We start by choosing λ ∈ A such that αk ≥∑
j 6=k λjk, for all k. Lemma A-4 guarantees the existence of such λ. Next note that because λ ∈ A we
have that Lk(θ̂) = −
∑







λjkF j(z) ≤ 0, ∀z ≤ θ̂, ∀k.
Note that (αk −
∑
j 6=k λkj) ≥ 0 for all k. If condition (i) holds, we can divide the inequality above by
fk(z) and use that F j(z)/fk(z) is non-increasing for any j(this is true under (i)) to conclude that the
resulting function on the left-hand side is nondecreasing. If condition (ii) holds then because all F j(z)
are non-increasing functions and zfk(z) is nondecreasing then the resulting function on the left-hand
side is nondecreasing. In conclusion the left-hand side in the equation above is bounded above by its
value at θ̂; however, since λ ∈ A, this value equals zero. This establishes (a). Condition (b) can be
verified in an analogous manner.
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B Proofs for Leading Example: Exponential Distribution
The supplementary appendix, possibly for online publication, contains the proofs for all the results
related to the exponential distribution.
Proof of Lemma 3. From Lemma 2 we have that θ̂L ≤ θ̂ ≤ θ̂H . For exponential distributions,
θ̂L = 1/λL and θ̂H = 1/λH . Therefore, θ̂ ∈ [1/λL, 1/λL]. Moreover, θ̂ must satisfy (8); if not, we could
increase it or decrease it and obtain a strict revenue improvement.
We provide a proof for the rest of the properties for general distributions satisfying (IHR). Note first
that θ̂ can be seen as a function of αL and αH but since αH equals 1− αL, we can effectively consider
θ̂ just a function of αL. Then, when αL equals 0 is as we only had type H buyers and, therefore,
the optimal threshold is θ̂H . While when αL equals 1 is as we only had type L buyers so the optimal
threshold is θ̂L. Hence, θ̂(0) equals θ̂H and θ̂(1) equals θ̂L.













αLfL(z)µL(z) + (1− αL)fH(z)µH(z)dz,
note that this is a linear function of αL and, for fixed αL, it is maximized at θ̂(αL). Hence,
`(θ̂(αaL), α
b
L) ≤ `(θ̂(αbL), αbL)
= `(θ̂(αbL), α
b
L − αaL) + `(θ̂(αbL), αaL)







Recall that θ̂ is in [θ̂L, θ̂H ], and therefore, θ̂L ≤ θ̂(αaL) < θ̂(αbL) ≤ θ̂H . This in turn implies that
µL(z) > 0 and µH(z) < 0, ∀z ∈ (θ̂(αaL), θ̂(αbL)),
hence for z in (θ̂(αaL), θ̂(α
b
L)) we have
αaLfL(z)µL(z) + (1− αaL)fH(z)µH(z) < αbLfL(z)µL(z) + (1− αbL)fH(z)µH(z),
which contradicts (B-1).




{ θ̂e−λLθ̂ − θe−λLθ









Before we begin the proof, we need some definitions and observations. Define the following functions
g(θ) ,
θ̂e−λLθ̂ − θe−λLθ
e−λH θ̂ − e−λHθ
and g(θ) ,
θe−λLθ − θ̂e−λLθ̂


















· e−θ̂(λL−λH) ≤ θ̂ · e−θ̂(λL−λH) ⇐⇒ θ̂ ≤ 1
λL − λH
. (B-5)





From equations (B-3),(B-4) and (B-5) we see that






{ θ̂e−λLθ̂ − θe−λLθ





e−λHθ − e−λH θ̂
}
(B-7)
contradicting the fact that condition (APR) holds.
For the other direction, assume that equation (9) holds. We first prove that for θ ≤ θ̂ we have
g(θ) ≤ g(θ̂); indeed,
g(θ) ≤ g(θ̂)⇐⇒ θ̂e
−λLθ̂ − θe−λLθ
e−λH θ̂ − e−λHθ
≤ (λLθ̂ − 1)
λH
· e−θ̂(λL−λH)
⇐⇒ λH · (θ̂e−λLθ̂ − θe−λLθ) ≥ (e−λH θ̂ − e−λHθ) · (λLθ̂ − 1) · e−θ̂(λL−λH)
⇐⇒ λH θ̂ · (1−
θ
θ̂
e−λL(θ−θ̂))− (1− e−λH(θ−θ̂)) · (λLθ̂ − 1) ≥ 0,
and hence we simply need to verify that this last inequality holds for θ ≤ θ̂. For doing so define
H(θ) , λH θ̂ · (1−
θ
θ̂
e−λL(θ−θ̂))− (1− e−λH(θ−θ̂)) · (λLθ̂ − 1),
and note that H(θ̂) = 0 and
H(0) = λH θ̂ + (e
λH θ̂ − 1) · (λLθ̂ − 1) ≥ λH θ̂ + λH θ̂(λLθ̂ − 1) = λH θ̂ · λLθ̂ > 0,
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where the inequality comes from convexity of the exponential function and the fact that θ̂ ≥ 1/λL.
Furthermore the derivative of H is given by
dH
dθ
= λH(λLθ − 1)e−λL(θ−θ̂) − λH(λLθ̂ − 1)e−λH(θ−θ̂),
and it can be easily verified that for θ ≤ θ̂ we have dH/dθ ≤ 0. This together with the facts that
H(0) > 0 and H(θ̂) = 0 imply that g(θ) ≤ g(θ̂) for all θ ≤ θ̂. This in turn implies
max
θ≤θ̂
{ θ̂e−λLθ̂ − θe−λLθ






Now we prove that for θ ≥ θ̂ we have g(θ) ≥ g(θ̂). Note that if we prove this we are done because this
and what we have just proven imply condition (APR). As before we do
g(θ) ≥ g(θ̂)⇐⇒ θe
−λLθ − θ̂e−λLθ̂
e−λHθ − e−λH θ̂
≥ (λLθ̂ − 1)
λH
· e−θ̂(λL−λH)
⇐⇒ λH(θ̂e−λLθ̂ − θe−λLθ) ≥ (λLθ̂ − 1) · (e−λH θ̂ − e−λHθ) · e−θ̂(λL−λH)
⇐⇒ λH(θ̂ − θe−λL(θ−θ̂))− (λLθ̂ − 1) · (1− e−λH(θ−θ̂)) ≥ 0,
note that the LHS of this last inequality is again the function H(·) but this time defined for θ ≥ θ̂. We
have H(θ̂) = 0. It is easy to prove that for θ̂ ≤ θ ≤ θ̃ the function H(θ) is increasing, and then for θ > θ̃
is decreasing, where θ̃ > θ̂ and dH(θ̃)/dθ = 0. Additionally,
lim
θ→∞
H(θ) = λH θ̂ − (λLθ̂ − 1) ≥ 0.
Hence, for θ ≥ θ̂, we have H(θ) ≥ 0, and therefore, g(θ) ≥ g(θ̂) for all θ ≥ θ̂, as desired.














therefore, for any αL ∈ [0, 1] equation (9) is satisfied. Then by Proposition 2 we conclude that the static
contract is optimal for any αL ∈ [0, 1].
Proof of Corollary 2. First, we show that θ̂(·) is continuous from the right at zero. Let {αnL} ∈ [0, 1]





and suppose that θ̂(αnL) does not converge to θ̂(0) = 1/λH . That is,
∃ε > 0,∀n0,∃n ≥ n0, |
1
λH







− θ̂(αnL)| > ε⇐⇒
1
λH
− θ̂(αnL) > ε.
This in turn means that we can create a subsequence {α`nL } ⊂ {αnL} such that
∀n, 1
λH
− ε > θ̂(α`nL ). (B-8)
However, since θ̂(α`nL ) is a maximizer of Π




−λLθ̂(α`nL ) + (1− α`nL )θ̂(α
`n
L )e









because λL > λH we can bound the LHS above to obtain
θ̂(α`nL )e








−λH 1λH . (B-9)
Note that the function θe−λHθ has a unique maximum at θ = 1/λH and since θ̂(α
`n
L ) satisfies equation





−λH( 1λH +δ(ε)) > θ̂(α`nL )e
−λH θ̂(α`nL ), ∀n,













−λH 1λH , ∀n,
therefore, taking the limit over n gives a contradiction. In conclusion, we have proved that θ̂(·) is
continuous from the right at zero. Now, to finalize the proof, recall that we are assuming that λL > 2λH
or equivalently 1λH >
1
λL−λH . However, since θ̂(0) = 1/λH and θ̂(·) is continuous from the right, we can







so thanks to Proposition 2, the sequential contract is optimal when we set αL > ᾱL. Note that the
same argument is valid for 1/λL. That is, we can show that θ̂(αL) is continuous from the left at 1 and















Hence, in [ᾱH , 1], the static contract is optimal. All of this implies that since θ̂(·) is a nonincreasing
function, we can always find ᾱ ∈ (0, 1) with the desired property.
Proof of Corollary 3. Fix λH and αL. Suppose the result is not true, that is,




From this we can construct a sequence λnL ≥ 2λH such that
lim
n→∞
λnL =∞ and θ̂(λnL) ≤
1
λnL − λH
, ∀n ∈ N,















However, since θ̂(λnL) maximizes Π












−λH 1λH ≤ Πstatic(θ̂(λnL)).





−λH 1λH ≤ 0,
a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4. We use the sufficient conditions in Lemma B-1 (which we state and proof
after the present prove). First note that since the support of the exponential distribution is unbounded
from above, we can take θ2 =∞ which eliminates condition (1). Conditions (2) and (3) can be cast as
θ1e
−θ1(λL−λH) ≥ θe−θ(λL−λH) ∀θ ≥ 0 and αL · λHθ1e−θ1(λL−λH) = −αH · (λHθH − 1), (B-10)















What we need to check is that θ1 ≤ θH . First, we show that








−λHθ1 < 0. (B-11)
To prove this inequality, note that since θ̂ is the optimal static cutoff, we have
αLθ̂e
−λLθ̂ + αH θ̂e
−λH θ̂ ≥ αLθ1e−λLθ1 + αHθ1e−λHθ1 . (B-12)
Then, we have




−λHθ1)− αLe−λLθ1 − αHe−λHθ1
(a)
≤ λH(αLθ̂e−λLθ̂ + αH θ̂e−λH θ̂)− αHe−λHθ1
(b)
< λH(αLθ̂e
−λLθ̂ + αH θ̂e
−λH θ̂)− αHe−λH θ̂
= λHαLθ̂e
−λLθ̂ + λHαHe
















where (a) comes from equation (B-12), (b) is true because the function −e−λHθ increasing and θ1 < θ̂,
and (c) comes from equation (8). Moreover, (d) comes from θ1 < θ̂. With this, we have proven (B-11),
and thus















































but replacing θ1 with 1/(λL − λH) in this last expression we get θH > θ1.
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Lemma B-1 The following conditions for the thresholds θ1 ≤ θH ≤ θ2 (as in Proposition 3) are
sufficient for their optimality in (PR):
1. RLH(θ1, θ2) ≤ minθ2≤θ RLH(θ2, θ);
2. maxθ≤θ2 R
LH(θ, θ2) ≤ RLH(θ1, θ2);
3. αL ·RLH(θ1, θ2) + αHrHH(θH) = 0.
Proof of Lemma B-1.
It is enough to prove that under these conditions, the optimal contract characterized by (θ1, θH , θ2)
is optimal for (PR). To prove this we use a Lagrangian relaxation (we do not relax the monotonicity
constraints) and show that this relaxation is optimized by the contract characterized by (θ1, θH , θ2).
First, we establish some properties that can be derived from conditions (1) to (3). Condition (3)
implies that θ2 ≥ θ̂L; otherwise, θ1, θ2 < θ̂L which would imply that RLH(θ1, θ2) < 0. In turn,
condition (3) would give RHH(θH) > 0 which would imply that θ̂H < θH . Since θH ≤ θ2 we would have
θ̂H < θH ≤ θ2 < θ̂L, that is, θ̂H < θ̂L which is not possible. Moreover, condition (2) together with the
fact that θ2 ≥ θ̂L imply that θ1 ≥ θ̂L. This yields RLH(θ1, θ2) ≥ 0, and thus we can use condition (3)
again to deduce that θH ≤ θ̂H . In summary, θ̂L ≤ θ1 and θH ≤ θ̂H .
Now, we provide the main argument. If θ1 = θ2, then we also have θ1 = θ2 = θH . Condition (3)
implies that the contract characterized by (θ1, θH , θ2) is the static contract. Conditions (1) and (2)
together yield (APR), and therefore, from Theorem 1, we deduce that the static contract is optimal.
Next suppose that θ1 < θ2, and define
Ω , {x : [0, θ̄]→ [0, 1] : x(·) is nondecreasing}.
We use x? to denote the solution characterized by (θ1, θH , θ2). The Lagrangian for (PR) is


















Consider the following multipliers
λ = αL ·RLH(θ1, θ2), wL = λ+ αL, wH = −λ+ αH .
Note that λ and wL are nonnegative, and for wH we have
wH ≥ 0⇔ αH + αHrHH(θH) ≥ 0⇔ rHH(θH) ≥ −1⇔ [θH − hHH(θH)] ≥ −hHH(θH)⇔ θH ≥ 0,




















where we can reduce attention to threshold strategies because xL(·), xH(·) are nondecreasing (see, e.g.,
Myerson (1981) or Riley and Zeckhauser (1983)). If we are able to show that L(x,u,λ,w) evaluated at
our candidate solution is an upper bound for the RHS above we are done. Let us begin with the second




































where in the first equality we used condition (3) and the inequality comes from the fact that rHH(·) is

















































which thanks to condition (1) in our hypothesis is true. A similar argument holds for θ ≤ θ2, but using
































we conclude that max(u,x)∈Ω L(u,x,λ,w) ≤ L(0,x?,λ,w), as required.
Proof of Proposition 6. We make use of Lemma B-2 which we state and prove after the present
proof. In that lemma we need to define the function













for any λ ≥ 0. For exponential distributions Lk(z|λ) becomes:

























Hence, Lk(·|λ) is concave, which means that it crosses zero at most two times. Using Lemma B-2 we
conclude that in the exponential case allocations have at most one step in which randomization occurs.
Lemma B-2 For any dual-feasible variable λ associated with the incentive constraints, define













If Lk(z|λ) crosses zero at most p, times then the optimal allocation xk has at most bp/2c intervals where
randomization occurs.
Proof of Lemma B-2. We divide the proof into two parts. In the first part, we construct a new dual
problem and state the complementary slackness conditions. This part of the proof follows the general
theory of linear programming in infinite dimensional space developed by Anderson and Nash (1987). In
the second part we exploit the complementary slackness conditions to show that the optimal allocation
xk has at most bp/2c intervals where randomization occurs.
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Part 1. Define the cone of nonnegative nondecreasing functions
K , {x : [0, θ̄]→ R|x is nonnegative and nondecreasing function}.











s.t xk(·) ∈ K, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
xk(θ) ≤ 1, ∀θ ∈ [0, θ̄] ,∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}




xk(z)F̄k(z)dz ≥ uk′ +
∫ θ̄
0
xk′(z)F̄k(z)dz, ∀k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
Note that the dual cone of K is
K∗ = {β :
∫ θ̄
θ





































where βk are the dual variables associated with the monotonicity constraints, ηk are dual variables
associated with the constraints xk(θ) ≤ 1, and λ,w correspond to the dual variables associated with













λ`k = 0, ∀k






λ`kF̄`(z) = ηk(z)− βk(z), ∀k, ∀z ∈ [0, θ̄]
λ,w, ηk(·) ≥ 0, βk ∈ K∗, ∀k.
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We must have complementary slackness. That is, for the monotonicity constraints (the cone constraints)
this means that if xk(·) changes at some θ, then
∫ θ̄
θ βk(z)dz = 0. Moreover, x(0) ·
∫ θ̄
0 β(z)dz = 0. All of
this for all k. For the upper bound constraints, we must have (1 − xk(θ)) · ηk(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ [0, θ̄]
and for all k.
Part 2. Consider an optimal primal-dual pair. Let xk be the primal solution for interim type k,
and βk, ηk and λ,w be the corresponding dual solutions. Observe that from dual feasibility, we must
have
fk(z) · Lk(z|λ) = ηk(z)− βk(z), ∀z ∈ [0, θ̄]. (B-14)
Let us denote by ẑ1 < · · · < ẑp the points where Lk(·|λ) crosses zero, and we let ẑ0 = 0 and ẑp+1 = θ̄.
Note that Lk(θ̄|λ) = α · θ̄ > 0, and by the feasibility of λ we have Lk(0|λ) = −wk/fk(0) ≤ 0.
Let z?1 , inf{z ∈ [0, θ̄] : xk(z) = 1} (if xk(z) never equals 1 we take z?1 = θ̄). We can assume
that z?1 > 0; otherwise, xk(z) would be equal to 1 everywhere in [0, θ̄] and the result would follow.
In turn, there has to be a change in xk around z
?




βk(z)dz = 0. Moreover, since xk(z) < 1 for all z < z
?
1 , complementary slackness implies that
ηk(z) = 0 for all z < z
?
1 . Therefore, Eq. (B-14) becomes
fk(z) · Lk(z|λ) = −βk(z), ∀z ∈ [0, z?1). (B-15)
Let q be the largest index in {0, 1, . . . , p} such that ẑq ≤ z?1 . Note that z?1 ∈ [ẑq, ẑq+1]. We show the
following claim:
Claim 1. Lk(·|λ) is positive in (ẑq, ẑq+1) and z?1 = ẑq.
Proof of Claim 1. First, suppose that Lk(·|λ) is positive in (ẑq, ẑq+1); we show that z?1 = ẑq. If
not, then for any z ∈ (ẑq, z?1), we have Lk(z|λ) > 0, which thanks to Eq. (B-15) yields βk(z) < 0 for













βk(z)dz < 0, (B-16)
but, this contradicts the fact that βk ∈ K∗. That is, z?1 ≤ ẑq but since ẑq ≤ z?1 we conclude that ẑq = z?1 .
To complete the argument, suppose that Lk(·|λ) is negative in (ẑq, ẑq+1) then, in particular, Lk(·|λ) is
negative in (z?1 , ẑq+1), and from Eq. (B-14), we deduce that βk(z

















a contradiction. In the second bracket, we use the fact that βk ∈ K∗. This concludes the proof of Claim
1.
This shows that xk(·) equals 1 in (ẑq, θ̄] and that it changes value at ẑq. Now, from Claim 1, we
know that Lk(·|λ) is negative in (ẑq−1, ẑq), and therefore, from Eq. (B-15) we deduce that βk(·) is
positive in (ẑq−1, ẑq). This together with
∫ θ̄
z?1
βk(z)dz = 0 imply that xk(·) is constant in (ẑq−1, ẑq) (by
means of complementary slackness any change would yield a contradiction). Let us denote the value of
xk(·) in (ẑq−1, ẑq) by χq. Note that if χq = 0, we are done. Similar to what we did before, we define
z?2 , inf{z ∈ [0, ẑq−1] : xk(z) = χq}. Note that z?2 < ẑq−1. If z?2 = 0, then xk(·) equals χq for all values
below zq, and therefore, there is nothing more to prove. Thus, assume that z
?
2 > 0. If z
?
2 = ẑq−1 then
xk(·) changes value at ẑq−1 and, therefore, by complementary slackness
∫ θ̄
ẑq−1
βk(z)dz = 0. However,
Lk(·|λ) is positive in (ẑq−2, ẑq−1) which by Eq. (B-15) implies that βk is negative in (ẑq−2, ẑq−1), but
this would contradict the dual feasibility of βk. Hence, we can assume that z
?
2 < ẑq−1.
Let q2 be the largest index in {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} such that ẑq2 ≤ z?2 . Note that z?2 ∈ [ẑq2 , ẑq2+1]. As
before, we can show that Lk(·|λ) is positive in (ẑq2 , ẑq2+1) and z?2 = ẑq2 . Note that this implies that the
value χq of xk(·) extends for at least two intervals, namely, (ẑq−2, ẑq−1) and (ẑq−1, ẑq).
The previous argument can be applied iteratively over all intervals defined by ẑ1 < · · · < ẑp. Since
in each step of the argument we cover two intervals, we deduce that there can be at most bp/2c different
values of χq′ , where q
′ is defined in every step as we did before. Moreover, if Lk(0|λ) < 0, then in the
interval (0, ẑ1), the dual variable βk(·) is positive. Because
∫ θ̄
ẑ1
βk(z)dz = 0 (this follows from the steps
of the argument) and x(0) ·
∫ θ̄
0 β(z)dz = 0, we must have x(0) = 0, and so in the last interval xk, equals
0.
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